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Abstract
The healthcare industry has been adopting technology at an astonishing rate. This
technology has served to increase the efficiency and decrease the cost of healthcare
around the country. While technological adoption has undoubtedly improved the
quality of healthcare, it also has brought new security and privacy challenges to
the industry that healthcare IT manufacturers are not necessarily fully prepared to
address.
This dissertation explores some of these challenges in detail and proposes solutions
that will make medical devices more secure and medical data more private. Compared
to other industries the medical space has some unique challenges that add significant
constraints on possible solutions to problems. For example, medical devices must
operate reliably even in the face of attack. Similarly, due to the need to access
patient records in an emergency, strict enforcement of access controls cannot be used
to prevent unauthorized access to patient data. Throughout this work we will explore
particular problems in depth and introduce novel technologies to address them.
Each chapter in this dissertation explores some aspect of security or privacy in the
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medical space. We present tools to automatically audit accesses in electronic medical
record systems in order to proactively detect privacy violations; to automatically
fingerprint network-facing protocols in order to non-invasively determine if particular
devices are vulnerable to known attacks; and to authenticate healthcare providers
to medical devices without a need for a password in a way that protects against all
known attacks present in radio-based authentication technologies. We also present an
extension to the widely-used beacon protocol in order to add security in the face of
active attackers; and we demonstrate an overhead-free solution to protect embedded
medical devices against previously unpreventable attacks that evade existing control-
flow integrity enforcement techniques by leveraging insecure built-in features in order
to maliciously exploit configuration vulnerabilities in devices.
Primary Reader: Dr. Aviel D. Rubin
Secondary Reader: Dr. Anton Dahbura and Dr. Malek Ben Salem
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The healthcare industry has been adopting technology at an astonishing rate. This
technology has served to increase the efficiency and decrease the cost of healthcare
around the country. However, while technological adoption has undoubtedly improved
the quality of healthcare, it also has created new security and privacy challenges
that healthcare IT manufacturers are not necessarily fully prepared to address in the
industry.
This dissertation explores some of these challenges in detail, and proposes solu-
tions that will make medical devices more secure and medical data more private.
Unlike many other industries, the medical space must address unique challenges and
requirements that place significant constraints on possible solutions to problems. For
example, it is imperative that medical devices continue to operate reliably even in the
face of attack. Similarly, due to the need to access patient records in an emergency,
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strict enforcement of access controls cannot be used to prevent unauthorized access
to patient data.
Throughout this work, we will explore particular problems in depth and introduce
novel technologies that provide solutions. Our work culminates in a vision for a more
secure and private technologically-enabled healthcare environment centered around
the integration of the technologies proposed in this work.
1.1 Security and Privacy Issues in
Modern Healthcare
In order to focus our research, we identified the most pertinent security and pri-
vacy issues in modern healthcare today. As technology plays an increasing role in
healthcare, numerous security and privacy problems are beginning to reveal them-
selves. In many cases we need new technologies to address the issues.
One particularly prevalent trend in healthcare IT today is the move from paper
charts to electronic medical records (EMRs), as mandated by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).6 In addition to mandating a transition
to EMRs, HIPAA contains numerous privacy provisions that healthcare providers
must follow in order to fully comply with the law. These provisions have created a
booming industry around technologies that help healthcare providers protect patient
privacy in a HIPAA-compliant environment.
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However, properly configuring and deploying these necessary types of privacy-
protecting technologies requires extensive expertise. To make matters worse, unlike
in other fields, privacy protections in healthcare cannot be enforced in a rigid fashion:
a healthcare worker may need emergency access to patient information, even when
he or she has not obtained prior authorization.
Currently, Healthcare providers must often rely on audits to determine whether
privacy violations have occurred, but such audits are complex and difficult to carry
out. EMR log audits require auditors to search through massive amounts of data
in order to identify a violation that may or may not have occurred. Administrators
with which we spoke told us that they don’t even try to perform an audit unless
they have a pre-existing indication of what they should examine. As a result, privacy
violations are often only detected in audit logs after they have already been reported
to a healthcare provider. Thus, this highly reactive approach to audits is only useful
for evidence gathering after a report has been made. Audits have only a very limited
range of utility for immediate privacy protection when emergency situations intersect
with patient privacy concerns.
Unlike corporate or home networks where physical access to the network is re-
stricted, healthcare practices need to treat a wide variety of patients, and thus their
networks are more vulnerable to physical attacks by malicious parties. In fact, in
most healthcare environments, potential attackers are left with completely unsuper-
vised access to computer on wheel (COW) carts containing both workstations which
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store private patient data, and safety-critical therapy devices. As a result of this
pervasive and constant threat, authorization in hospitals is critical in order to pre-
vent malicious parties from improperly accessing patient resources or tampering with
medical equipment.
Furthermore, as healthcare practices become increasingly wired and complex,
many more medical devices are becoming network-connected; some devices receive
firmware updates over the Internet, and some even send data to remote servers or
cloud storage so that doctors can retrieve test results from a mobile device when they
are away from the office. Since many medical devices implement widely-deployed
technologies, even if an attacker does not have direct physical access to a medical de-
vice, the attacker can often still find remotely exploitable vulnerabilities that would
allow him or her to interfere with the operation of the device.
Although health networks today contain many embedded medical devices respon-
sible for directly administering therapy, device manufacturers often focus on reliability
and usability rather than on security. In addition, even if some devices possess the
underlying options to be configured securely, many of these devices are not actually
configured securely by manufacturer default. Instead, healthcare IT staff are expected
to properly secure the device before it is put into use at their specific location.
Unfortunately, many healthcare practices do not possess the skilled IT workers
who are able to determine how to properly configure and secure all of the different
medical devices, both to protect privacy and to prevent attacks. This secure config-
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uration problem is compounded by the fact that medical device manufacturers often
charge for device updates, which include security fixes. These updates are often ex-
pensive, so healthcare providers are hesitant to purchase them unless they add useful
new features to the devices.
There are many negative consequences of an attacker compromising an embedded
medical device connected to a healthcare network. The attacker could degrade the
performance of the device, tamper with measurements that the device may take,
disable the device, or in some cases cause the devices to directly harm patients.
(One doctor we spoke with mentioned that in the case of radiation therapy machines
an attacker could disable safety controls and potentially utilize the device to kill a
patient.)
1.2 Our Vision
We envision the solutions proposed in this thesis being combined into a cohesive
system that modernizes security and privacy in the healthcare environment of the
future. In such an environment, our proposed technologies will dramatically decrease
the cost and increase the effectiveness of securing medical devices and protecting
confidential patient information. We believe that the technologies proposed in this




Let us envision the workflow in our imagined future medical environment. Dr.
Smith is a doctor in cardiology. He begins his shift by putting on his KBID bracelet.
Dr. Smith signs into a terminal to activate the bracelet. He then begins making
his rounds and visits his first patient. Using a location-based tracking system imple-
mented on the Beacon+ platform, Dr. Smith is able to pull up the patient’s chart
directly on his smartphone, without having to enter any information into the phone
at all. Dr. Smith sees that the patient needs an EKG. He moves to the EKG machine
in the corner of the room and taps his KBID bracelet to the contact pad in order to
authenticate himself to the computer terminal that controls the procedure.
Today Dr. Smith is on double-duty; his friend in geriatrics has taken a personal
day and Dr. Smith has agreed to handle any emergencies in geriatrics while he is
simultaneously on-call in cardiology. Suddenly, Dr. Smith receives a phone call. One
of the patients in geriatrics has suffered a seizure. Dr. Smith pulls out his smartphone
and enters the patient’s name into the EMR system’s mobile application in order to
pull up the patient’s medical record. The EMR software prompts the doctor that
since this patient is in a geriatrics and Dr. Smith is registered in cardiology, the
access will be allowed but it will be logged in the audit system. Dr. Smith proceeds
and discovers that the geriatrics patient’s infusion pump is administering too high a
dose.
Although these infusion pumps used by the hospital are ten years old and have pre-
viously been subjected to malicious re-configuration attacks, thanks to the retrofitted
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Sentinels present on each device, the insecure web configuration and telnet modes of
the pumps are disabled when the pumps are deployed in the hospital. The healthcare
IT staff was able to quickly determine which pumps to retrofit by running a machine
learning-based fingerprinting tool to identify which pumps were running vulnerable
versions of non-upgradable ROM-based firmware.
Dr. Smith enters an immediate-infusion drug order directly from his phone in
order to correct the patient’s dosage, and pages a nurse in the department to check
on the patient. Later, the doctor’s EMR access is detected in an automated audit.
The hospital auditor investigates the access and sees that Dr. Smith has accessed
the data of a patient in geriatrics. The auditor checks the shift records and discovers
that Dr. Smith had a temporary one-day assignment in geriatrics during the period
the access had occurred. The auditor moves on to the next anomalous access.
All of the technologies just described are fully detailed in this work. They have
served to improve the quality of care that Dr. Smith is able to provide while making
the technology easy to use. The technology has further served to help ensure that
patient privacy is being upheld in a way that is transparent to Dr. Smith. Our future
healthcare environment leverages technology to protect patient privacy, increase the
speed of care, and protect devices against previously unknown attacks, all while




Clearly many of the issues described above are complex and multifaceted. This
dissertation looks at each issue and introduces techniques that can be deployed in real-
world healthcare settings in order to work towards addressing each of these unique
challenges in the healthcare IT landscape.
1.3.1 Enforcing Minimum Necessary Access in
Healthcare Through Integrated Audit and
Access Control
One of the most important requirements of HIPAA is the ”minimum-necessary”
access requirement, which states that healthcare personnel must be granted no more
access to electronic healthcare data than is necessary in order to work effectively. Due
to the complexity of constructing such a policy, many hospitals do not comply with
the regulation and instead manually audit the logs when they suspect that abuse has
occurred. This audit-only approach is error-prone, reactive, and difficult to carry out
due to the volume of data contained in the logs.
To address this problem, we have built a policy engine capable of automatically
auditing logs and separating normal accesses from abnormal accesses. Our policy
engine implicitly constructs role-based policies from the audit data in order to produce
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a workable policy that can be used to enforce minimum-necessary access. The policy
engine can also audit an existing role-based access policy by comparing it to observed
accesses in order to determine whether the existing policy is over-permissive compared
to actual usage patterns.
1.3.2 Classifying Network Protocol Implementa-
tion Versions: An OpenSSL Case Study
We present a new technique for identifying the implementation version number of
software that is used for Internet communications. While many programs may ex-
change version numbers, oftentimes only a small subset of them send any information
at all. Furthermore, they usually do not provide accurate details about which imple-
mentation is used. Using machine learning techniques to build a feature database,
we then apply this database to network traffic to identify specific implementations
on servers. We apply our technique to OpenSSL and report our results. This work
is particularly useful for extracting information about protocol implementations on
Internet-facing embedded devices and may actually be the only non-invasive way to
determine whether such devices are likely to be vulnerable to known attacks. An
administrator of a hospital network could run this tool against the entire network in
order to determine whether deployed devices are likely to be attacked by malware.
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1.3.3 Sentinel: Secure Mode Profiling and
Enforcement for Embedded Systems
Embedded devices are employed in a variety of mission-critical environments. Al-
though many of these devices contain a wide variety of modes and features to support
all possible use cases, in practice only a small subset of these modes may be used in a
given deployment. In many embedded devices, some of these unused modes represent
a security risk.
We address this problem by creating Sentinel, a secure mode profiler for embedded
systems. Sentinel uses a bus tapping interface to derive a partial control flow graph
during device execution. This graph represents the subset of device modes actually
observed during use. The control flow graph is generated without any prior knowledge
of the device or its software and constitutes a security profile which can be used to
audit device execution in order to detect attacks. The profile can be easily enforced
by existing bus monitors with minor modifications.
1.3.4 Beacon+: Applications of Short-Range
Authenticated Unidirectional Advertisements
We present Beacon+, a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) device that extends the
design of the popular Beacon specification with unspoofable, temporal and authen-
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ticated advertisements. We use Beacon+ to implement a secure real-time tracking
system that also serves as a foundation for other novel location-based applications.
We describe two such applications, namely the location-based restrictions on access
control we implement, and real-time indoor navigation.
1.3.5 KBID: Kerberos Bracelet Identification
The most common method for a user to gain access to a system, service, or
resource is to provide a secret, often a password, that verifies his identity and thus
authenticates him. Password-based authentication is considered strong only when the
password meets certain length and complexity requirements, or when it is combined
with other methods in multi-factor authentication. Unfortunately, many authenti-
cation systems do not enforce strong passwords due to a number of limitations; for
example, the greater amount of time taken to enter complex passwords. We present
an authentication system that addresses these limitations by prompting a user for
credentials once and then storing an authentication ticket in a wearable device that
we call Kerberos Bracelet Identification (KBID).
1.4 Outline of This Work
Each chapter in this dissertation explores one unsolved problem related to security
or privacy in the health medical space.
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Chapter 2 examines current security and privacy research trends in the health and
medical space.
Chapter 3 looks at automatically auditing accesses in electronic medical record
systems in order to proactively detect privacy violations.
Chapter 4 introduces a tool for fingerprinting network-facing protocols in order
to non-invasively determine they prevalence of protocol implementation deploy-
ments that are vulnerable to known attacks. We envision that such a tool
would be useful to healthcare IT staff in determining whether or not devices on
their network support protocol or library versions that are vulnerable to known
attacks.
Chapter 5 demonstrates a zero-overhead solution to protect embedded medical
devices against previously unpreventable attacks that leverage built-in device
features in order to allow an attacker to compromise the security or privacy of
an embedded device.
Chapter 6 presents an extension to the widely-used beacon protocol in order to
add security in the face of active attackers. We use these extensions to add a
second factor of authentication to electronic medical record lookups on mobile
devices.
Chapter 7 describes an authentication bracelet that allows for fast authentica-
tion in healthcare settings while protecting the wearer against known attacks
12
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Although security and privacy in the health and medical space (henceforth health
and medical security) is an extraordinarily broad topic, there are currently several
distinct subtopics in this field that allow us to divide the research space up into a
finite number of clusters. These clusters represent the four loci of the vast majority
of academic research in this space today.
Health and medical security has become a critical topic, as electronic medical
records have become more widely distributed and medical devices are increasingly
connected to the ”Internet of Things.” Healthcare providers have moved from storing
medical records in vast paper systems to storing medical records in local computer sys-
tems, to storing medical records in cloud-based health information exchanges (HIE).
Naturally, as the storage of sensitive patient information transitions to cloud-based
systems, healthcare providers must emphasize patient privacy protection. In order
to support these efforts, the Office of the National Coordinator and the National
Science Foundation have both awarded large research grants to consortiums of uni-
versities to study both the security and privacy aspects of modern healthcare with the
goal of producing the technological capability necessary to adequately secure these
technologies.7,8 Much of the privacy research in these spaces has come out of these
inter-university collaborative efforts.
In addition to protecting patient privacy, healthcare providers must also protect
medical devices from malicious exploitation. Today, medical devices from insulin
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pumps to radiology machines all have network-connected components. If an attacker
successfully compromises such a device, he or she may be able to affect device perfor-
mance, and potentially be able to kill the patient attached. Such an attack may even
be undetectable. Thus medical device security is of paramount importance. Unfortu-
nately, this issue, particularly in the non-implantable medical device space, has not
been as widely studied in the academic space as the privacy issues described above.
Although general embedded system security has been extensively studied, as described
in Section 1 healthcare IT environments have dramatically different constraints than
other types of industrial environments, so the problem deserves specialized attention.
Luckily, device manufacturers are increasingly aware of these concerns and are work-
ing to resolve these security issues before exploitation of medical devices becomes a
pervasive threat.
Most existing research in medical data fits into one of four clusters. These clusters
are briefly defined as follows:
Controlling and Auditing Access to Medical Data Access control, especially
with respect to electronic medical record data, is a particularly fertile area of
research in health and medical security. Projects have looked at various aspects
of this problem, including structuring appropriate policies and enforcing access
control constraints without interfering with patient care.
Healthcare providers leave an audit trail when they access patient data. This
audit trail is often composed of thousands or millions of individual accesses; as
15
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a result, the shear volume of this data makes auditing the accesses difficult. A
large number of recent research in health and medical security attempts to solve
this problem through the use of various automated techniques.
Protecting Patient Privacy Numerous research projects have looked at securing
private patient data through various means such as self-encrypting cloud-stored
medical records and outsourcing computation on encrypted data. Such research
has focused on how to improve the usefulness of medical data by allowing it to
be shared with authorized third parties, while simultaneously preventing it from
being accessed by unauthorized parties.
Authenticating Users in Medical Settings Authentication can be a time con-
suming process, particularly if complex policies are used. Given the time-critical
nature of resource access in emergency situations, numerous researchers have
looked at the problem of authentication in healthcare and have proposed various
solutions that are designed to make authentication more secure and seamless.
Securing Medical Devices The security of medical devices against remote ad-
versaries is of critical importance for patient safety. Medical device security is
an emerging research area that extends traditional embedded systems security
research by considering it within the context of the additional challenges of
healthcare environments.
In this chapter we describe some of the current research in each of these areas of
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health and medical security.
1.5 Controlling and Auditing Access to
Medical Data
In healthcare settings, audit and access control go hand-in-hand. Access control
in the medical field is complicated by the need for healthcare providers to access
information during emergencies, regardless of whether they have been granted access
to the information prior to the time of the emergency occurrence. This scenario is
called ”breaking the glass” and it allows a previously unauthorized user access to
information. This problem has been studied in some existing literature.9 As a result
of these requirements, oftentimes an audit log is necessary to help an administrator
understand whether or not the set of access control policies being enforced are the
same as the set of access control policies being followed. The difference between these
two sets has been referred to in some work as an ”empathy gap” between the two
models.10
1.5.1 Building Better Policies
There has been much research looking at building better policies in healthcare
environments.11–13,13–16 One common approach to the problem is to build better
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models.11,13,17–19 Work on Experience-based Access Management11 sought to improve
access control models in healthcare by viewing them as dynamic and ethereal as
opposed to static and fixed. EBAM, as a concept, proposes a flexible approach to
healthcare access control, one that is constantly being re-evaluated. In section 2 we
build on this concept by using actual audit logs combined with data mining techniques
to actually facilitate this re-evaluation. Related work17–19 has also looked at using
audit logs in order to better understand how to model roles in the policy.
1.5.2 Formal Analysis
Other work has sought to formalize the language20,21 used to describe medical
record accesses in order to allow policy rules to be analyzed using formal logic.22
This is particularly useful within the context of trying to accurately model policy
interactions across healthcare environments15 rather than just within them.
1.5.3 Improved and Automated Audit
Yet another aspect of this work addressing issues in current medical security tech-
nology looks at making better use of audit logs. In general this is accomplished in
one of two ways: by making it easier for administrators to manually audit logs23,24
or by building machine-learning based systems to perform automated log audits.25–27
Most research has focused on automated log analysis, and therefore, has proposed
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numerous techniques for performing automated log audits. One technique enforces
formalized dataflow models on the audit logs in order to determine where the accesses
branch from the predetermined dataflow pathways.25,28–30
Several other techniques use statistical analysis and machine learning to detect
potentially unauthorized accesses.?, 26, 31 Other research has used such techniques in
order to determine how closely an audit log fits a predefined access control model
in realtime32 or to audit logs that are missing data points.33 Additionally work has
focused on purpose instead of access. This work imposes restrictions on how accessed
data may be used. It builds a model using audit logs to determine when the purpose
policy may have been violated.34,35
1.5.4 Game Theory Models for Audit
Finally, a small body of research exists that looks at audit in game theoretic
terms.36–38 These projects holistically reconcile the audit and enforcement in order
to determine how to best provide incentives and deterrents39 when enforcing privacy
rules on healthcare data. This work models policy enforcement as a game and looks
to refine audit algorithms to improve their efficiency.38
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1.6 Protecting Patient Privacy
A large body of research in health and medical security focuses on protecting pa-
tient privacy. Protecting patient privacy is a broad mandate with different meanings
to different people. Research has focused on policies for sharing medical records,
or parts of medical records, with third parties, as well as encryption-enforced ac-
cess control, rights management, and outsourced computations on encrypted medical
data.
1.6.1 Third Party Access to Medical Data
One popular area that current research has explored is how patients can best
manage and share sections of their medical data with third parties.40–43 One realiza-
tion of this idea is the concept of the personally controlled health record40–the idea
that a medical record is fully owned by and travels with the patient rather than the
healthcare provider. Additional work in this area looks at differentiating between
sensitive data in patient health records and other types of data.43 This work looks
to segment medical records in a way that allows patients to share parts of medical
records with different parties under different conditions. This is similar to how a
smartphone permissions system allows different apps to access different features on
the device.
Much of the work in this area looks at health information exchanges (HIE) and how
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different institutions in an HIE may have different policies for securing and sharing
patient data. One interesting problem on which some research has focused is how
to search through data stored at different healthcare sites44 in a privacy preserving
fashion. Another interesting researh focus has been on how to limit the sharing of
data between different sites to only relevant information in order to approximate how
data has been shared in the past.42 For example, previously, if a patient needed to
share information from a primary care physician with a specialist, the primary care
physician’s office would only fax over relevant information to the specialist and would
omit the non-relevant parts of the patient’s medical record. Some work in this area
has even gone as far as to propose a cryptographic model for an entirely anonymous
healthcare system.45
1.6.2 Cryptographic Enforcement of Sharing Poli-
cies
Additional work in this area looks at enforcing medical record sharing policies
using cryptography.46 Some of this work considers using techniques such as identity-
based encryption (IBE) to enforce sharing constraints on records shared in health-
information exchanges.46 similarly, other work looks at using attribute-based encryp-
tion (ABE) to enforce these constraints.12 In the IBE case, medical records can be
encrypted in such a way that they can only be accessed by certain entities. In the
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ABE case, medical records can be encrypted, in whole or in part, under boolean poli-
cies. If the accessor possesses the necessary attributes to satisfy the policies, then
the accessor is able to decrypt the record. Additional work has looked at storing
encrypted medical data with a third-party cloud-provider and using a client-side de-
cryption in order to access the data.47 Other work along these lines has examined
the possibility of using DRM-technologies to enforce access control.48,49
1.6.3 Outsourced Computation on Encrypted Data
Lastly, an increasingly important area of research that has been gaining popularity
as of late, focuses on allowing researchers to run experiments on sensitive patient
data without actually accessing the data. Due to the highly sensitive nature of some
data, such as sequenced genomes, researchers have begun trying to devise schemes
that allow all operations to be performed on data that is still encrypted by using
homomorphic encryption.50–56 This area of research is still in its infancy, but we
believe that it will exponentially increase in popularity in the coming years as large-
scale homomorphic encryption schemes become more practical and we learn more
about the extent of the private patient data that the human genome contains.
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1.7 Authenticating Users in Medical Set-
tings
Authentication has always been of particular concern in medical settings because
it is the necessary first step in the healthcare provider’s process of engaging with any
subsequent technological solution such as those outlined in this work. Unfortunately,
healthcare staff often see authentication mechanisms as obstacles to accessing the
patient data necessary to provide life-saving care in an emergency situation. In some
time-critical situations, a patient’s health may depend on how quickly staff can au-
thenticate to a computer system to obtain critical information. Similarly, healthcare
staff may not always remember to log out of a terminal before they are called off to
deal with another emergency situation. This leaves computer systems that contain
incredibly sensitive information potentially exposed to attacks. Thus, authentication
has become a somewhat popular area of study in health and medical security.
Similarly, as medical care is increasingly moving out of healthcare facilities and
into the home, researchers have been investigating new techniques that would allow
a user to authenticate to their personal health devices. In many cases these devices
are used as part of a body area network and thus they must all be authenticated to
the same user simultaneously. Therefore, the biometric research relevant to our work
focuses primarily on new biometrics that are suitable for use in such health environ-




Authentication-related research projects can be split into two classes: biometrics
and authentication methods.
1.7.1 Biometrics
Researchers are always looking for new biometrics that can be used as part of
authentication protocols. Recent research has discovered some novel biometrics that
differ significantly from the traditional, more widely-known biometrics such as reti-
nal patterns and fingerprints. These new biometrics are being investigated for their
applications to mobile healthcare and body-area networks.
One area of research has been on using bioimpedance, which measures the human
body’s natural resistance to electrical currents, as a biometric. Research has shown
that each person’s body responds to different frequency alternating currents in slightly
different ways.57 The uniqueness of this response can be utilized as a biometric when
authenticating a user.
Other research has examined using vocal resonance as a biometric. Vocal res-
onance is the resonance of a voice as measured from a device placed on someone’s
body–essentially it is the internal resonance of their voice inside of their body. Re-
search in this area produced a device58 that was able to differentiate between different




Both of the above mentioned biometrics could be integrated into wearable medical
devices in order to authenticate a user to the device outside of a traditional healthcare
setting, without requiring any action whatsoever on the user’s part.
1.7.2 Authentication Methods
Recent research has proposed several novel authentication methods meant to im-
prove the speed and efficiency of authentication in healthcare.
One emerging research focus in authentication methods uses body-coupled com-
munication. Body-coupled communication uses skin conductivity as a data transmis-
sion medium. ”Existing work has introduced a system for key exchange over a body
area network.59 By applying a very small voltage to the tissue of a dead mouse, the
researchers were able to communicate at a rate of 5Hz or 5 bits per second.”3
Additional work in authentication methods as applied to healthcare, examines
what researchers call the ”one body problem”.60 This research is concerned with the
problem of whether multiple medical devices are resident on the same body. The
solution61 works by coordinating readings accelerometers present on multiple sensors
with the readings from an accelerometer on a smartphone in order to determine
whether the sensors are on the same moving body.
There has also been some research on the problem of de-authentication, a par-
ticularly pertinent problem in modern healthcare.62 This work resulted in a working
prototype of a deauthentication bracelet called ZEBRA. ZEBRA’s function is to de-
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tect when a user is done using the computer terminal and to then deauthenticate the
user from the terminal even if the user forgets to do so. ”In ZEBRA, a user wears a
bracelet that encapsulates a wireless radio, accelerometer, and gyroscope; these com-
ponents record and transmit wrist movements to a computer system that is currently
being used. The computer system continually compares received movement measure-
ments to input it receives from its keyboard and mouse. If these two measurements
are not correlated, the current session is de-authenticated.”3
1.8 Securing Medical Devices
Medical devices are one of the most critical types of cyber-physical systems in
existence today. Although most medical devices share many commonalities with
other types of industrial embedded devices, medical devices also pose unique security
challenges not found in most other types of embedded systems. These challenges were
described in 1. Note that the medical devices relevant to the work in this dissertation
are non-implantable in nature. Thus, we will limit this discussion of medical device
security to non-implantable medical devices, particularly since a recent survey of the
state of implantable medical device security already exists.63
Despite these serious concerns about medical device safety and security, medical
device-specific embedded systems security research is a relatively new field. In fact,
as little as five years ago there had been almost no academic research exploring the
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problem.64 Since then, several high profile vulnerabilities were discovered in infusion
devices, which significantly increased public awareness regarding the issue.
Unfortunately, there does not appear to have been significantly more work on
securing non-implantable medical devices. It is likely that as vulnerabilities in these
devices continue to be discovered, this situation will change in the near future.
1.8.1 Detecting Malware in Medical Devices
Malware detection on medical devices is an interesting problem because medi-
cal device software typically cannot be directly modified. Thus, any host-resident
malware detection scheme is utterly infeasible in a medical setting. There has been
some work focusing on using side-channels to detect malware in medical devices.65
This work uses power as a side channel to determine if a medical device is behav-
ing differently than its normal profile, possibly indicating that the device has been
compromised.
1.8.2 Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Medical Devices
Medical device vulnerabilities are becoming an increasingly alarming topic. Re-
cently, the discovery of remotely exploitable vulnerabilities in a popular model of
infusion pump triggered an FDA warning about the security of these devices.66 This
warning significantly raised industry-awareness of the security problems resident in
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embedded medical devices. There has been some previous research performed on the
safety of embedded medical devices, which explored threats across insulin pump sys-
tems, a specific type of medical infusion system.67 It explored the attack surface of
these infusion pumps and detailed specific security concerns that the industry should





Access in Healthcare Through
Integrated Audit and Access
Control
2.1 Introduction
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),6 enacted in
1996, sets strict privacy requirements that healthcare providers must abide by in
the handling of sensitive electronic health care data. One such requirement is the
”minimum necessary access” requirement,69 which states that healthcare personnel
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must be granted no more access to electronic healthcare data than the minimum
necessary in order to work effectively.
Historically, Role-Based Access Controls (RBACs) with fine-grained policies have
been the norm in granting and limiting access to information to groups of users with
well-defined roles.70–74 At first glance, this model may seem an appropriate fit for
tightly controlling access to data in a healthcare setting. However, the RBAC model
implicitly depends on the fact that access policies are well defined and understood by
involved parties before accesses occur.75 Since the purpose of an RBAC policy is to
prevent unauthorized accesses to data in real-time, the current systems are inflexible.
In contrast, the emergency-based nature of today’s healthcare environment has
more fluid and temporal-based access control requirements. In emergency situations,
employees may need access to healthcare data in ways that are unknown (and unknow-
able) to the policy creator in advance.76 In these situations, denying the employee
access in a rigid and inflexible fashion may actually cause serious injury or death to
the patient. Healthcare providers must perform a balancing act between giving em-
ployees the minimum necessary access to healthcare data to perform their duties while
simultaneously giving enough access to prevent injury to the patient in an emergency
situation.
Due to the delicate nature of this balancing act, and in an attempt to err on the
side of caution in time-sensitive life or death situations, many healthcare providers
ignore the HIPAA mandate and fail to implement policies that grant only minimum
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access.77,78 Instead these healthcare providers rely on detailed audit logs, which
contain records of every access made across the entire system, in order to detect
access abuse.79 When an abuse is suspected, IT staff must search through the logs
manually in order to piece together what happened. At a large hospital, such as the
one that produced the data that we worked with, there are on the order of millions
of separate accesses totaling gigabytes of data per year. In the best of cases, when
the IT staff has an idea of what types of abuse may have taken place, the problem
is time-consuming and error prone.80 In the worst of cases, when IT staff does not
know that access abuses have occurred, the problem quickly becomes intractable and
abuse may go unnoticed.81
In contrast to the above process, our system eliminates the need to make a trade-
off between giving employees the minimum necessary access to healthcare data and
allowing for unfettered access to data in emergency situations. We do so by dynami-
cally generating flexible RBAC policies based upon typical access patterns observed
from real audit logs. These policies fit the specific use case of the environment for
which they are generated, which will have its own set of slightly different require-
ments compared to any other similar environment. While we consider our setting for
this research to be the healthcare field, there is no reason that our tool cannot be
used in any other field that generates detailed audit logs. In fact, there are likely
many different applications where generating an RBAC policy based on real accesses
is useful.
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Our solution frames the policy generation problem as embarrassingly parallel82
and is highly scalable. It can not only generate derived policies from actual audit
logs but can also compare these derived policies to an existing policy in order to
generate an overall assessment of how compliant the derived policy is with the stated
policy. Finally, our tool also separates exception-based accesses from normal accesses
in order to make manual auditing feasible and straightforward.
Our Contribution. This work contains four significant and novel contributions:
1. We have constructed a tool that can look at access logs and derive an implicit
role-based access control (RBAC) policy.
2. This tool can be used in a different mode to check accesses for compliance with
an intended policy even when no RBAC is actually implemented. This mode
provides a method for auditing the accesses that are not explicitly defined in
the stated policy.
3. This tool can compute a risk level to be used in determining compliance with
the ”minimum necessary access” requirement of HIPAA.
4. Using our tool we have analyzed data collected from a large hospital, have au-
dited accesses that are not in its policy, and have generated a HIPAA minimum
necessary access compliance risk level.
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2.2 Role-Based Access to EMR Data
In this section we construct a theoretical framework for discussing role-based ac-
cess control policies derived from electronic medical record audit logs and we define
the concept of exception-based accesses.
2.2.1 Policy Definitions
Before we can compute and audit policies we must first define a theoretical frame-
work in which to discuss them in the abstract. A policy is a set of Boolean equations
defining valid accesses in the EMR system. We are concerned with four key pieces of
data when formulating our policies: Department, Role, Screen and Action. Depart-
ments and roles are assigned to individual users. A department is a logical subdivision
of a healthcare provider specializing in a particular area of healthcare. A role defines
a user’s particular function within a given department. Healthcare providers can as-
sign employees to multiple departments and to multiple roles within each department.
A screen is a logically grouped view for some subset of patient data. An action is
some function computed over a screen. Actions include viewing, editing, printing and
copying.
For the purposes of this discussion, we can view a department-role mapping as a
single role mapping in our overall policy (hereinafter: role) and we can view a screen-
action pair as a single access type (hereinafter: action) in our overall policy. A policy
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is defined as a function F : Roles 7→ A : A ⊂ Actions. As previously discussed, many
healthcare providers do not have a policy to enforce the minimum necessary access
requirements of HIPAA. We consider this situation to be the default in the absence of
any other policy definition and we define the corresponding policy to be the Cartesian
product of all roles and actions: Roles× Actions.
To provide a basic example, consider the following departments: Oncology,Radiology,
roles: Doctor,Nurse, screens: Prescription and actions: V iew,Edit. Our default
policy will be:
Oncology,Doctor → Prescription, V iew
Oncology,Doctor → Prescription, Edit
Oncology,Nurse→ Prescription, V iew
Oncology,Nurse→ Prescription, Edit
Radiology,Doctor → Prescription, V iew
Radiology,Doctor → Prescription, Edit
Radiology,Nurse→ Prescription, V iew
Radiology,Nurse→ Prescription, Edit
Note that in some instances, a single user may be assigned several roles spanning
multiple departments. Our system provides two methods for handling these cases.
Method 1. We consider the user’s accesses within each role and department separately.
For example, if a user is a doctor in both radiology and in oncology, the user’s
accesses would first be compared to the accesses of other users in oncology and then
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be compared to the accesses of other users in radiology.
Method 2. Alternatively, our system can compare the user’s accesses to the accesses of
other users with the exact same group of role assignments. In this case we essentially
consider multiple role assignments as a single compound role. With this method,
the accesses of our doctor of both radiology and oncology would be compared to the
accesses of other doctors also assigned to both radiology and oncology.
For the purposes of our analysis in this chapter, we consider each role assignment
independently as in method 1.
2.2.2 Exception-Based Accesses
As a side effect of determining our minimum necessary policy we will implicitly
be determining exception-based accesses as well. For our purposes, exception-based
accesses are accesses to EMR fields that differ significantly from the normal access
patterns of other users in the same role. Often times these accesses occur in emer-
gency situations with no time to spare and with a patient on the verge of serious
injury or death. Healthcare providers refer to the need to access medical record data
in an emergency situation without regards to any existing access control systems as
”breaking the glass.” While breaking the glass may be one legitimate reason to step
outside the confines and an access control policy, in other cases a user may access
restricted information for nefarious purposes (such as to snoop on a major celebrity
that is staying in the hospital). Since it is impossible to distinguish ”breaking the
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glass” situations from illegitimate accesses with perfect accuracy, our policy engine
will notify auditors about all exception-based accesses so that the auditor can de-
termine how to best proceed. In the next section we will explore the log analysis
functions that our policy engine offers while paying special attention to which func-
tions point out exception-based accesses, which functions point out violations of the
minimum necessary policy and which functions point out both.
Many administrators may not want to ultimately remove exception-based accesses
from their local policies after examining them on a case-by-case basis. We spoke with
administrators who often felt that it was necessary to have a mapping in the policy in
case of an emergency even if it was accessed extremely infrequently. In such situations
it is especially important to note exception-based accesses because the only way an
administrator will be able to detect abuse here is by performing periodic audits on the
access logs. Most evidence of abuse will appear as exception-based accesses, which
should therefore be audited more carefully than regular accesses.
2.3 Policy Engine
Our policy engine performs a variety of statistical tests in parallel on an interme-
diate data representation derived from EMR audit logs.
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2.3.1 Intermediate Representation
Given that our tool must be able to work with audit logs from any number of
different systems, each using different and incompatible log formats,83,84 we construct
an intermediate representation in order to convert all logs to a standard format that
can be worked with by our tool. The basic format is straightforward: we simply
parse out the Department, Role, Screen, Action and UserID fields (which should be
supported by any tool which claims to keep detailed HIPAA-compliant audit logs)
and output them in exactly that order. With this intermediate representation in
place we can extend our tool to parse any log formats as necessary by writing a new
mapper to parse a given log format into intermediate representation format.
2.3.2 Motivations for Parallelism
The data sets that we analyzed were small enough for our tool to process in serial
rather than in parallel. However, we opted for a parallel architecture because we
believe that in the near future, as healthcare providers increasingly shift to storing
all of their medical records electronically, health information exchanges will store
medical records for several healthcare providers in a region. This trend has already
begun. For example, the Chesapeake Regional Information System for Our Patient85
in Maryland already works as a centralized repository for medical records for many
healthcare providers in the region. As health information exchanges deal with ever-
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increasing numbers of medical records from many different sources, the audit logs
generated by EMR systems will dramatically increase in size, eventually necessitating
the use of parallelism and big-data analysis.
Our computations can be constructed in such a way that the log analysis problem
becomes embarrassingly parallel.82 Our problem requires us to analyze audit logs
and compare within roles. Our universe has many roles and statistics are only ever
computed within a given role–never across roles. Thus, we actually split our data
into groups where all users with a given role are said to be in the same group. Once
we do this, all of our computations are within groups rather than across the entire
data set and can thus be localized.
2.3.3 Exploiting Parallelism
We are therefore using data decomposition86 to break up and parallelize our task.
We perform several different classes of computation upon each of our groups. Many
of these computation classes depend on the output of previous computation classes.
According to Flynn’s Taxonomy87,88 this type of problem is best suited to a multiple
instruction multiple data (MIMD) architecture.89 We use MapReduce90–92 to fill
this role. Since no data sharing occurs between individual computation classes and
different computations can run in parallel, the MapReduce design methodology is well
suited to our particular problem. Because MapReduce was designed for analyzing
large data sets and was built to scale with the number of nodes in the cluster, our
38
CHAPTER 2. ENFORCING MINIMUM NECESSARY ACCESS IN
HEALTHCARE THROUGH INTEGRATED AUDIT AND ACCESS CONTROL
process can be super-scaled to work on huge data sets with the use of a multi-node
MapReduce cluster.
2.3.4 Log Analysis Functions
Each log analysis function is implemented as a separate set of MapReduce tasks.
These tasks can be computed on the dataset in parallel, except where dependen-
cies between the tasks exist as described in section 3.5. Note that all computations
within each task are also performed in parallel on different portions of the dataset
simultaneously.
2.3.4.1 Statistics
Our first MapReduce job computes simple statistics across the dataset. These
statistics are used in our later analyses. The job consists of a single mapper:
map(rows)→ (role, access, uid) (2.1)
and a single reducer:
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The mapper takes one or more EMR audit logs as input and parses out the role-
access combination and the UID that made the access. The reducer takes the output
of the mapper as input and computes the average and standard deviation. It also
records how many users in the role utilized a specific role → access mapping and
the total number of accesses overall. Note that this computation simply ignores users
who do not access the information at all (rather than adding them to the total users
count). Our other jobs will catch cases where a few users under-utilize or over-utilize
their access privileges and cases where a small percentage of users are responsible for
all of the accesses for a given role.
2.3.4.2 Access Counts
The counts job is also used in later analyses. It uses the same mapper as the
statistics job but rather than computing statistics its reducer outputs the number of
times each user utilized a given role→ access mapping.
map(rows)→ (role, access, uid) (2.3)
reduce(role, access, uid)→ (role, access, uid, count) (2.4)
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2.3.4.3 Unutilized Mappings
After we have produced our basic statistics, the first auditing function that our
minimum necessary evaluation will perform is to determine unutilized mappings.
These are mappings in the default policy that are never utilized by any users.
map(role, access)→ roles× access (2.5)
reduce(role, access)→ (role, access) :
(role, access) /∈ (2)
(2.6)
The output of this job will be all instances where the ideal policy allows for a (role,
access) mapping for which there is never a corresponding access in the audit logs. In
these cases the default policy is over-expressive. Such accesses are the opposite of
”minimum-necessary” and are candidates for removal from the policy.
2.3.4.4 Average Below Threshold
After we have simplified our ideal policy by removing all null cases, we turn our
attention to looking at underutilized mappings. To do so, we look for mappings where
the average number of accesses per user is lower than a pre-established threshold. This
threshold is adjustable, but we have set to two for the purposes of our analysis. Our
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job will analyze the output of the statistics job and look for any instances where the
average number of accesses per represented user is lower than this threshold.
reduce(role, access, avg, stdDev, numAccesses,
numRepresented)→ (role, access, average) :
average ≤ threshold
(2.7)
The purpose of this job is to point out potential exception-based accesses. We
believe that the accesses with low averages represent exception-based access because
they show mappings that are seldom accessed on average.
Note that the threshold value for average number of accesses is user-configurable.
2.3.4.5 User Low Percentage
It may be the case that a small number of users assigned to a particular role are
responsible for 100% of the utilization of a specific access credential. This might occur
when a group of users has different job requirements than other users assigned to the
same role (in which case the policy should have two roles) or it might occur because
a small group is colluding to commit misconduct. In either case, this is exception-
based access because it shows that most people in a given role do not utilize credentials
that a small number of people in the same role have been observed utilizing. For our
purposes we have set the threshold for reporting this activity to 5%. The ”user low
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percentage” job outputs a list of mappings where fewer than 5% of the users with the
role are responsible for 100% of the utilizations of the given credential.
map(rows)→ (role, access, id) (2.8)






Note that the threshold value for the minimum percentage of users assigned to a
credential that must utilize the credential is user-configurable.
2.3.4.6 Abnormal Utilization of Credentials
Abnormally frequent utilization of a credential can be an indication that a user
in a particular role may actually be performing actions that are significantly different
than others in that role. This could be indicative of the need for a second role to
increase the granularity of the policy. It could also be indicative of a user abusing
their access privileges.
Abnormally infrequent utilization of a credential, on the other hand, could be an
indication that a user may be over-assigned roles or that a role definition is too broad.
It may also be an indication that a user is not performing all of its job duties and
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is thus not using the privileges granted to them. In either case these results warrant
further investigation.
Abnormally frequent and abnormally infrequent utilization of access privileges are
by definition exception-based accesses because they represent an access pattern that
significantly differs from the norm.
Abnormally Frequent Utilization
map(rows)→ (role, access, id) (2.10)
reduce(role, access, id)→ (role, access, id, count) :
count > avg + 3 ∗ stdDev
(2.11)
Abnormally Infrequent Utilization
map(rows)→ (role, access, id) (2.12)
reduce(role, access, id)→ (role, access, id, count) :
count < avg − 3 ∗ stdDev
(2.13)
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Note that the number of standard deviations user to establish the threshold is user-
configurable.
2.3.5 Scheduling MapReduce Jobs
To fully exploit the parallel nature of this problem we have written a dependency
graph for these jobs. In this way, jobs can be run in the most efficient manner possible
and scheduled simultaneously with other jobs that have the same dependencies. This
allows for more efficient parallelization of tasks than would be possible if all of the
jobs were chained in a linear fashion. We schedule our jobs as shown in Figure 2.1
2.4 Evaluation
We obtained access to a collection of anonymized logs used by a major hospital in
the Midwest1. This hospital uses a default permissive policy and thus any user can
access any field in any medical record.
The format of these logs is shown in Table 2.1.
1Although the logs are anonymized, due to patient privacy laws the dataset is still considered
confidential. No part of the dataset has been shared or reproduced in this chapter.
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Figure 2.1: Dependency tree of MapReduce jobs.
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Inpatient Hospital Patient Location
Inpatient Encounter Pseudonym
Inpatient Encounter Start Date




Ambulatory Pri. Care Phys. Pseudonym
Ambulatory User Pseudonym
Ambulatory Chart User Access Dates
Inpatient User Department Affil.
Ambulatory User Department Affil.
Inpatient User Role
Ambulatory User Role
Ambulatory Chart Access Module
Ambulatory Chart Access Action
User Inpatient Note Activity Count
User Inpatient Order Activity Count
Inpatient Chart User Access Flag
meta load exectn guid
meta orignl load dts
Table 2.1: Fields defined in anonymized EMR audit logs.
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2.4.1 Results
All tests ran on a data set consisting of a 353.1MB EMR audit log containing
646,483 entries. This audit log contains anonymized electronic medical record data
and we received IRB approval to utilize it in our analysis. Our policy engine sched-
ules all MapReduce jobs on a specially configured Hadoop cluster running on three
PowerMac G5s with OpenJDK installed. We scheduled all jobs and dependencies
using the JobControl functionality offered by Hadoop.
2.4.1.1 Unutilized Mappings
The first part of our unutilized mapping test was to calculate the default policy.
Since no such policy was in use at the hospital that provided us with our sample data,
we calculated the ideal policy by using the Cartesian product of roles and actions:
Roles×Actions. We calculated a total of 1, 747, 200 separate mappings, which consti-
tutes our default policy. The second part of our test is to determine which mappings
were actually utilized as observed in the audit logs. There were only 37, 942 actually
utilized mappings. We determined that there are 1, 709, 445 unutilized mappings.
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Figure 2.2: Utilized vs. Unutilized Mappings
= 1, 747, 200− 37, 942
= 1, 709, 445
2.4.1.2 Average Below Threshold
The threshold test ran over the output of our statistics job. Its output was any
mapping where the average number of accesses was less than or equal to two. Through
our analysis we found that there were 18, 981 such mappings out of the 37, 942 map-
pings that were utilized at all. From this we can see that there are actually only
18, 961 mappings that are accessed on a regular basis (i.e. not exception-based).
This result is shown in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Mappings with Average Utilization Below Threshold
NormalAccesses
= ObservedMappings−BelowThreshold
= 37, 942− 18, 961
= 18, 981
2.4.1.3 User Low Percentage
This job computes the percentage of users with a given role that are responsible
for all of the accesses that were observed for each mapping. If the total percentage
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of users with a specific mapping who made an access was under 5% of all users then
this was output. In order to get this information we wrote a custom mapper that
computes the total number of users in each role. We aggregate this with the output
of the statistics function (which indicates the number of users that made a specific
access) and divide the number of users that made an access by the total number of
users in a specific role. Using this we computed a total number of 6, 316 mappings
where fewer than 5% of users were responsible for 100% of the accesses. These totals
are shown in in Figure 2.4 Note that there is a significant overlap between the map-
pings output in this job and the mappings output by the threshold job–there were
5, 108 mappings that were repeated as output from both.
NormalAccesses
= ObservedMappings− LowPercentage
= 37, 942− 6, 316
= 31, 626
2.4.1.4 Abnormal Utilization of Credentials
This job is a reducer-only job. It takes the output of the statistics job and con-
catenates it with the output of the counts job. Using the output of the statistics job,
it calculates Average+3∗StandardDeviation and Average−3∗StandardDeviation.
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Figure 2.4: <5% of Users Responsible for 100% of Accesses
It then takes the counts from the counts job and compares them to the calculations it
has made. If the count is greater than the Average + 3 ∗ StandardDeviation for the
role it outputs this as an abnormal high. It uses similar means to output abnormal
lows. From the dataset we have observed that there are 12, 838 individuals with a
specific mapping that utilize this mapping abnormally frequently and no individuals
with a specific mapping that utilize this mapping abnormally infrequently. This re-
sult is graphed in Figure 2.5. Note that there are 411, 450 unique individual accesses
to the 37, 942 utilized role to access mappings in our dataset.
NormalAccesses
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Figure 2.5: Abnormally Frequent Utilization of Access Privileges
= UniqueObservedAccesses−Outliers
= 411, 450− 12, 838
= 398, 612
2.5 Analysis
We use a table to interpret our results. We first assign colors to the various types
of accesses: green for normal accesses, orange for exception-based accesses, and red
for unutilized accesses. We have three risk categories for each color: high, medium
and low. The risk categories are based on the percentage of accesses of a given type
divided by the total number of possible mappings in the policy. For example, if 90%
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of mappings were unutilized then the HIPAA compliance value would be high-risk in
the red column. Note that the different colors can have different risk levels for the
same data set. We have sketched out the percentage breakdown per category and
risk level below:
Green Orange Red
High < 75% > 25% 25%
Medium 75− 90% 10− 25% 10− 25%
Low > 90% < 10% < 10%
We compare the percentages that we yield from our previous analysis to the values
in this table in order to determine our risk category for each color. This gives us three
separate risk numbers. We compute define an overall risk level as the median of these





We see that this corresponds to:
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Percentage Risk Category Risk Level
50% Green High Risk
22% Orange Medium Risk
28% Red High Risk
Therefore, the overall risk level will be ”High.”
2.5.1 Risk Level for Audit Logs
In order to categorize risk we assign risk levels to each type of access. Risk levels
correspond to the risk that an observed policy does not comply with the HIPAA
minimum-necessary access requirement for a specific category. We also assign an
overall risk level for the observed policy as a whole.
Green Category
The green category calculates mappings with an average number of accesses above
our minimum threshold. We note that we have calculated 1, 747, 200 possible role to
access mappings in our sample data. We have determined that 18, 961 mappings had
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− (LowPercentage ∩ AboveThreshold)
= 37, 942− 18, 961− 1208
= 17, 753
Now that we have calculated our normal accesses based on our exception-based




We observe that 1.016% < 75% and we therefore calculate that we are in the
”High” risk category.
Orange Category
The orange category tracks all mappings which exist due to exception-based ac-
cesses compared to the total number of utilized mappings. It shows the overall per-
centage of all exception-based accesses.
ExceptionBasedAccesses
= BelowThreshold + LowPercentage
− (LowPercentage ∩BelowThreshold)
= 18, 981 + 6, 316− 5, 108
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We therefore calculate that we are in the ”Low” risk category because 1.156% <
10%.
Red Category
The red category tracks the percentage of unutilized mappings. From the above
data we can see that we have 1, 747, 200 mappings in our ideal policy. We see that




We therefore calculate that we are in the ”High” risk category since 97.828% of
our mappings are unutilized.
Overall Risk
As stated, the overall risk is the median of our risks for the three individual
categories. We see that we have risk levels of ”High”, ”Low”, and ”High” and thus
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Figure 2.6: Total Access Type Breakdown
our overall risk level will be ”High”.
2.6 Related Work
Previous research has explored using statistical and machine learning techniques
for role mining and audit.93,94 Research has also explored anomaly detection in
electronic medical record systems.95 The work below is particularly related to our
work as it has explored using audit logs to reconcile an access control policy with
observed usage.
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2.6.1 Privacy Management Architecture
In 2007, Bhatti et. al. propose framework called PRIvacy Management Architec-
ture (PRIMA)79 to compare a theoretical access control policy (PPS) to the actual
usage observed in EMR audit logs (PAL) in order to determine theoretical policy cov-
erage as well as to propose policy changes to PPS that can help bring PAL more in
line with PPS. This is accomplished by proposing additions to the rules in PPS to
account for typical accesses observed from PAL. Our work is similar but builds on the
previous techniques by taking the opposite approach and removing superfluous rules
from PPS.
2.6.2 Experience-Based Access Management
Experience-based access management (EBAM)76 is an emerging field which sepa-
rates an ideal access control model from an enforced model and uses an audit process
bring the ideal model more in line with actual access patterns. Prior work74 has
successfully performed role prediction using electronic medical records. Our work ex-
tends this prior work by additionally proposing policy enhancements using the same
data. Our policy engine realizes many of the goals of EBAM on a big-data scale and
with a real prototype system that can audit access logs and is thus an instantiation
of EBAM applied to the electronic medical record access control. By regularly using
our policy engine to perform audits, an administrator can keep a policy up-to-date
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based on observed, real-world usage of EMR system.
2.6.3 Explanation-Based Auditing System
The explanation-based auditing system (EBAS)96 proposed by Fabbri et. al. au-
dits EMR accesses based on the premise that employees in a specific role are respon-
sible for the majority of accesses to certain types of medical records that correlate
with the role. For example, the personnel within the cardiology department should
logically be responsible for the majority of normal accesses to the medical records of
cardiology patients. EBAS uses this principle as its basis for determining the underly-
ing reason for an access and for categorizing the access as normal or exception-based.
EBAS is similar to our policy engine in that it uses information about role as-
signments to determine whether a particular access is exception-based however the
mechanisms used to categorize accesses differ significantly. EBAS attempts to de-
termine whether a particular access makes sense in the context of the underlying
condition for which a patient is being treated whereas our policy engine attempts to
determine if a particular access is similar to accesses made by other users assigned to
similar roles.
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2.7 Future Work
The work outlined here can be extended in several key ways to further increase
the utility that our system provides to healthcare providers.
2.7.1 Large Scale Log Analysis
As is clear from our evaluation above, we only had access to a 300MB log with
roughly 600, 000 lines of data. This log represents the number of accesses in a three
month period at a large hospital. In the future we envision health information ex-
changes which provide electronic medical record storage and policy enforcement for
all of the healthcare providers in a particular region. In such a scenario the size and
scale of electronic medical record audit logs has the potential to increase dramatically.
Our policy engine is built with scalability in mind. Computing the regional electronic
medical record access policy based on aggregated audit logs is a useful extension to
our current work.
2.7.2 Real-Time Policy Engine
This policy engine could be extended with the ability to analyze accesses in real
time. In such a situation, when a user attempts to make an exception-based access
an auditor can be notified when the access attempt occurs. Real-time auditing deters
unauthorized accesses by allowing an auditor to closely monitor the behavior of every
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employee in the hospital at all times. Such a scenario allows a user to ”break the glass”
when absolutely necessary while simultaneously discouraging frivolous circumventions
of the policy.
The real-time policy engine would be built using a client-server architecture with
an auditor having access to an administrative web application and users having access
to a mobile healthcare application. As the client makes queries to the server, the
queries would be evaluated and compared to the audit logs in real-time by the policy
engine to determine if the accesses are exception-based. Exception based accesses
will then be reported to the client and the client can determine whether or not to
continue, knowing that the access will also be reported to the auditor.
2.7.3 Detecting Medical Mistakes and Prescrip-
tion Fraud
Our policy engine can be modified to detect prescription fraud. The audit logs in
our sample dataset contain detailed information about a patient’s diagnosis and the
healthcare provider actions taken as a result. This information includes a prescription
and treatment history. We can look at the treatments for other patients with similar
medical histories and ailments and use this information to determine whether or not
a given medical treatment is exception-based. An auditor can then individually audit
cases where treatment for a condition appears to be outside the norm in order to
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determine whether or not a mistake has been made or fraud has occurred. We can
similarly compare doctors individually to the other doctors with the same role in
order to determine whether or not a doctor is prescribing treatments in a way that is
atypical.
2.8 Conclusion
We can clearly see from our data taken from a real healthcare setting that in a
permissive policy there are an overwhelmingly large number of mappings that are
never utilized. We have developed and demonstrated a working system for separat-
ing these mappings from utilized mappings. We have furthermore developed highly
scalable techniques for separating exception-based accesses from utilized mappings.
We have constructed a tool to interpret and analyze these results and deployed it as







Many Internet protocols communicate meta information about the software that
is running at each end host. Included are details such as protocol version number,
available parameters, software name and version, and other useful information that
allows protocols to self-tune their interaction. Although the meta information in-
cluded in the early messages in Internet protocols can be extremely useful, it also
introduces potential security risks. Due to publicly available lists of software vulner-
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abilities corresponding to early versions of nearly any well-known implementation,
by announcing an implementation version number, the software is also broadcasting
a set of vulnerabilities. Although exchanging protocol version number is frequently
necessary to ensure interoperability, as a security precaution, many protocol imple-
mentations provide no information about the implementation version number. This
represents a challenge to those interested in measuring and classifying Internet traffic.
Our goal in this chapter is to provide a framework and a tool for measuring the
prevalence of protocol implementation versions and specific instantiations for com-
mon communication protocols on the Internet, without trusting the meta information
shared by the communicating parties. Rather than believing the version numbers and
implementation identifiers that are included in the traffic, we attempt to automati-
cally infer protocol version numbers and to additionally classify network traffic ac-
cording to specific implementations, based on observable implementation fingerprints.
Our approach is to use machine learning to extract features from training data for
known protocol implementations and versions. Once we build a database of features
for a particular protocol, X, we crawl the web, speaking X to as many protocol peers
as possible. Our analysis engine then uses the database of features that was built with
the training data to attempt to determine what version and implementations of X we
have found. Thus, we are able to measure the prevalence of specific protocol versions
and implementations on the Internet without trusting that the implementations are
speaking the truth.
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As a case study, we implement our system and measure the prevalence of OpenSSL
versions on the Internet. We find that a small fraction (about 7%) of Apache de-
ployments use a Linux distribution-default configuration which report the OpenSSL
version used. We use this as ground truth data to train our classifiers. Our results
indicate that many insecure versions of OpenSSL are in active deployment, and we
believe that our research presented here has led to a much more accurate analysis
of the state of SSL on the Internet than was previously possible. This case study
demonstrates the utility of our general framework for measurement.
We believe that our tool would be useful in evaluating protocol library versions on
closed-source devices. One such scenario where this could be the case is in hospitals.
A typical hospital contains a multitude of closed-source network-connected medical
devices. Administrators often have no insight into how the software on these devices
is implemented. Given the current widespread security and privacy concerns in the
health IT industry, administrators can use a fingerprinting tool such as the one that
we propose in this chapter in order to determine how prevalent devices with security
vulnerabilities are on their networks. This information can be useful in determining
how to best segment the hospital network.
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3.2 Tool design and case study
methodology
In this section we give a high-level overview of our classification tool, which uses
a combination of benign scanning and machine learning to identify version numbers
for protocol implementations deployed on remote servers. We designed the tool using
a modular architecture so that it may be used in a variety of Internet measurement
studies. The end result is a tool which is useful for classifying protocol implementa-
tions for which we have some labeled data. For our SSL/TLS case study, we rely on
web servers which are configured to report their version number.
3.2.1 Architecture
Our classification tool consists of four components: a URI generator, a feature
extractor, a database, and an analysis engine. Figure 3.1 shows the components and
the flow of information through the system. The URI generator, feature extractor
and classification algorithm are modular and can be easily replaced by new modules
for different tasks. We first describe each component in the abstract; then we describe
our concrete instantiation for classifying OpenSSL versions.
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Figure 3.1: Architectural diagram for the classification tool.
URI Generator Feature Extractor Database Analysis Engine
Internet
3.2.1.1 URI generator
The URI generator’s job is to produce a set of URIs to be consumed by the feature
extractor. This modular component can be as simple as a static set of URIs produced
one at a time or as complex and dynamic as may be required for the particular use
case. The same generator can be used for a variety of classification tasks. Examples
of generators include a generator that produces the Alexa top 500 sites,97 a generator
that walks through the entire IPv4 address space, and a web crawler that starts at
a fixed set of web sites and recursively crawls links it encounters. We use the last
example in our SSL/TLS case study.
3.2.1.2 Feature extractor
The feature extractor takes as input a URI, interacts with the network server
pointed to by the URI, and produces a feature vector for an arbitrary set of features.
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For example, the feature extractor can fetch web pages, query the server for config-
uration options, or engage in aggressive probing such as that performed by standard
network measurement tools like nmap. The feature extractor is necessarily specific
to the classification task; however, the modular nature of our architecture makes
swapping out the feature extractor for a different implementation easy.
3.2.1.3 Database
After the feature extractor has produced a feature vector, it is inserted into a
generic relational database.
3.2.1.4 Analysis engine
The heart of our system is the analysis engine which runs one of a variety of
machine learning classification algorithms on the data in the database. The analysis
engine heavily leverages the Python Orange library,98 an open source data visualiza-
tion and analysis tool, to first cluster and then classify the data. The analysis engine
assumes that some subset of the data has labels.
We used a semi-supervised learning approach to classify the remaining, unlabeled
data. Since there are likely to be a large number of protocol implementation ver-
sions (e.g., for our OpenSSL study, we found 79 distinct versions), we use k-nearest
neighbors (kNN) as our classifier. The downside of kNN is that its accuracy depends
heavily on the similarity metric used. To mitigate this, we first perform a k-means
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clustering and then run kNN for each cluster.
Although we use k-means and kNN, they are not the only possible choices. Some
applications may perform better with other choices and thus this is a configurable
option. We experimentally validated that k-means and kNN are good choices for our
use case among the set of algorithms supported by Orange. Another option which
may perform well for our use would be a multiclass logistic regression since many of
our features are binary or categorical.
3.2.2 OpenSSL version instantiation
To be useful as a classification tool, the URI generator and feature extractor need
concrete instantiations.
3.2.2.1 URI generator
Our URI generator is implemented as a web crawler that traverses HTTP links and
recursively looks for any new HTTPS links to pass to the feature extractor. To deter-
mine where to start our crawl, we first identified several websites that contain a large
number of external links to many different domains. We pointed our crawler at several
of these sites, including http://www.cnn.com and http://news.ycombinator.com
and ran it until we had collected a set of about 123,000 websites. We believe this set
to be a representative sample of the sites frequently visited by average users because
the sites are all within a few degrees of separation from popular websites.
70
CHAPTER 3. CLASSIFYING NETWORK PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION
VERSIONS: AN OPENSSL CASE STUDY
3.2.2.2 Feature extractor
For each URI produced by the URI generator, the feature extractor initiates a
secure connection to the server and interrogates it to learn a variety of features in-
cluding:
• supported SSL/TLS versions and ciphersuites;
• secure/insecure renegotiation support;
• session resumption support;
• CA, validity, issue date, expiration date;
• TLS compression support;
• TCP/IP stack information;
• HTTP headers;
• web server configuration.
Some of the features we discovered had surprising characteristics. For example, we
discovered that the server response HTTP header was reported by 81.7% of the servers
in our data set. 7.8% of those server responses contained a number of useful features
such as the version numbers of most of the Apache software stack including Apache
modules like mod perl and mod php and, importantly for us, OpenSSL. These ver-
sion numbers form the labels that the analysis engine uses. The server response is
described in more detail in Section 6.6.
We construct our feature extractor by extending version 0.4 of iSECPartner’s
SSLyze tool.99 SSLyze provides methods to enumerate all cipher suites for SSLv2,
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SSLv3, TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2. In addition, SSLyze provides methods to
enumerate session resumption support, to scan for insecure session renegotiation, and
to collect information about site certificates (e.g., expiration date, issuing certificate
authority, and certificate signature validation).
We implemented the following extensions to SSLyze via new plugins: TLS com-
pression support detection (i.e., to determine vulnerability to the CRIME attack100);
HTTP headers collection generated by website navigation; server response string
parsing and TCP/IP configuration information collection.
3.3 SSL/TLS background
Secure Socket Layer (SSL/TLS)101 is perhaps the most important security pro-
tocol on the Internet. Although SSL/TLS has many applications—including Virtual
Private Networking and inter-application communication—it is most commonly used
to secure web traffic served via the HTTPS protocol. The relevance of TLS and
HTTPS has increased in recent years, as many websites (including Gmail, Facebook
and Twitter) have begun to deploy HTTPS by default.102–105
While TLS is widely deployed across the Internet, there are only a small number of
popular implementations. When considering HTTPS, the most common are OpenSSL
(used by a majority of Apache deployments) and Microsoft’s SChannel. Results
from the February 2013 Netcraft survey indicate that Apache servers dominate IIS
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implementations across surveyed Internet domains,106 indicating that OpenSSL is
likely the most popular TLS implementation on the Internet.
In fact, given the widespread dependence on OpenSSL, it is reasonable to say
that for many users, OpenSSL is TLS. This should draw attention from the security
community as there are numerous versions of OpenSSL in current deployment, many
of which include serious protocol vulnerabilities.107–109 If an attacker can determine
the version of OpenSSL deployed on a specific webserver, he may be able to seriously
compromise the effectiveness of any TLS connection made to that site.
Surprisingly, we have very little information on the deployment of OpenSSL li-
brary versions, because most web servers do not advertise this information. Even if
an Apache server version is known, this does not necessarily imply that the server is
using a known version of OpenSSL: in many systems, the installed OpenSSL version
is determined by various factors, including the particular Apache and OS distribution,
the presence of other software on the system, and (most commonly) server miscon-
figuration. This can lead to the widespread deployment of old, broken versions of the
library.
3.3.1 SSL/TLS (in)security
Recent attacks on SSL/TLS, such as BEAST110 and CRIME,100 demonstrate the
sensitivity of SSL/TLS security to configuration choices made by server administra-
tors. We briefly describe several protocol and implementation vulnerabilities below.
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Many of these were identified by the SSL Pulse project.111
3.3.1.1 SSLv2 support
SSLv2 is known to have many vulnerabilities which make it unsuitable for use in
secure communications. Although SSLv2 is considered so insecure that major Linux
distributions don’t even build OpenSSL with support for it anymore, the SSL Pulse
data estimates that 28.4% of SSL servers on the Internet today support this version
of the protocol, more than the number of sites that support TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2
combined (9.2% and 11.4% respectively).111
3.3.1.2 Insecure session renegotiation
In 2009 a practical attack on SSLv3/TLSv1.0 was proposed that exploited flaws
in the session renegotiation feature allowing for a man-in-the-middle attack. The
vulnerability allows an attacker to queue an HTTP command to be executed by the
server on behalf of the client immediately when a client makes an SSL connection.
3.3.1.3 Insecure CBC mode ciphersuites
Several recent attacks have illustrated flaws in the implementation of CBC mode
encryption within SSL and TLS. These flaws stem from two basic causes: the im-
proper use of initialization vectors110,112 and flaws related to TLS’s insecure MAC-
then-encrypt approach to authenticated encryption.108,113 The latest of these vul-
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nerabilities108 was patched in February, 2013, hence these attacks remain an active
concern. Similar flaws are also present in Datagram TLS, and were recently exploited
by AlFardan and Paterson.114
3.3.1.4 TLS compression support
A general class of attacks exploiting protocol vulnerabilities due to TLS compres-
sion and SPDY. While this mode of operation has been recognized as insecure for a
number of years,115 the recent CRIME attack demonstrated the feasibility of using
this vector to attack critical information such as session cookies.100
3.3.1.5 Software vulnerabilities
The OpenSSL implementation of TLS and SSL has been subject to numerous
software vulnerabilities. These include dozens of implementation flaws with potential
consequences ranging from denial of service to remote code execution.116
One of the results of our research is the ability to identify versions of OpenSSL in use
on the Internet. Since many versions of OpenSSL contain known, severe vulnerabil-
ities, such as information leakage and remote code execution,117–119 by examining a
large, representative sample of servers, we get an indication of what fraction of servers
in use today are vulnerable.
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3.4 Results
All tests described below were run on m2.4xlarge Amazon EC2 instances with
64 GB of RAM and four cores running Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6, PostgreSQL
8.4.12, Python 2.6.6 and Orange 2.0b. The tests were extremely memory and CPU
intensive and even with these sizable resources our tests took on the order of hours
to days to run on a test data set containing 123,345 scanned sites.
3.4.1 Prediction accuracy
As described in Section 4.4, our analysis engine takes a semi-supervised learn-
ing approach to version identification. To determine how accurate our classification
is, we perform a 10-fold cross validation on our training data which consists of the
self-reported OpenSSL versions. Interestingly, we find that if we exclude only the
OpenSSL version from the Apache server response HTML header, we can identify
the OpenSSL version with overwhelming probability by using the reported version
numbers of Apache modules like mod php and mod perl; however, this result is mis-
leading. Among all 9,653 of the scanned web sites which report module versions
numbers, only 615 do not report an OpenSSL version. We hypothesize that this is
due to the use of a different SSL/TLS library such as GNU TLS. Thus, when testing
accuracy, we omit the entire server string from each 10% test set.
Because the accuracy of kNN is so dependent on the similarity metric, we first
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Version Component k = 10 k = 20 k = 30
major.minor 91.6 94.3 93.4
fix 75.5 74.0 75.7
patch 50.2 49.6 54.7
distro-build 49.6 49.2 54.7
Table 3.1: Percentage of OpenSSL version components correctly predicted for k clus-
ters. The percentages in each row are the percentages of correctly predicting the
version components up to the given component.
cluster similar points and run kNN on each cluster (see Section 4.4). The accuracy
of our classification (weakly) depends on the number of clusters we use. We test with
k = 10, 20, and 30 clusters. For each cluster, we use k = 10 neighbors to classify each
test point. OpenSSL versions are split into: major, minor, fix, patch and (optionally)
distro-build versions.120 For example, an OpenSSL version running on Fedora Linux
might be openssl-1.0.0a-fedora1. The major version would be 1, the minor 0, the fix
0, the patch a and the distro-build fedora1. For OpenSSL, there are essentially two
major.minor version combinations in use, 0.9 and 1.0. Therefore, we tread major and
minor versions as a single version component. Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show the
percentage of versions that can be identified correctly.
3.4.2 Observed OpenSSL versions
Since we are focused on classifying OpenSSL versions, we need to remove data
points which do not correspond to OpenSSL versions but come from Microsoft SChan-
nel, GNU TLS, or other SSL/TLS implementations. The first step of the analysis
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Figure 3.2: Percentage of OpenSSL version components correctly predicted for k
clusters.
engine is to perform k-means clustering. This produces clusters of data whose feature
vectors lie close together in the feature space. We hypothesize that OpenSSL data
points are likely to cluster together (although not necessarily in a single cluster) and
that other implementations are not likely to lie in clusters with (many) OpenSSL data
points. To that end, for each cluster, we examine the number of data points that are
labeled and throw out any cluster which does not contain at least 10% labeled data.
After removing clusters with too few labeled data points, we have 61,832 unla-
beled data points. From this we can give a rough breakdown of popularity of OpenSSL
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Table 3.2: Most popular OpenSSL versions on the Internet.
versions on the Internet, Table 3.2. In the following section, we discuss the implica-
tions of these results in the context of vulnerabilities present in different versions of
OpenSSL.
3.4.3 Vulnerabilities
From the OpenSSL website’s known vulnerability report section116 we see that
75.9% of known vulnerabilities apply to five or more OpenSSL versions within the
same patch family. Thus if the OpenSSL implementation can be accurately finger-
printed to within a patch family then there is a high probability that at least some
of the vulnerabilities reported for the guessed OpenSSL version will apply even if the
guess is incorrect.
Based on the results in Table 3.2 and data from the OpenSSL vulnerability re-
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Figure 3.3: Percentage of OpenSSL deployments with at least n unpatched vulner-
abilities
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Distribution OSSL Version CVEs
Debian Squeeze (6.0) 0.9.8o 11
Debian Lenny (5.0) 0.9.8g 24
Debian Etch (4.0) 0.9.8c 26
RHEL 6 0.9.8e/1.0.0-fips 0/14
RHEL 5 0.9.7a/0.9.8e-fips 14/0
RHEL 4 0.9.6b/0.9.7a 9/14
Fedora 18 1.0.1c 3
Fedora 17 1.0.0i 3
Fedora 16 1.0.0e 9
Table 3.3: Default OpenSSL versions shipping with popular Linux distributions.
port,116 we have computed the number of reported vulnerabilities for each OpenSSL
version that we have predicted using our analysis engine. Our results show that 95%
of all deployed OpenSSL versions have at least one known CVE that hasn’t been
patched by OpenSSL (but that may have been patched by an individual distribution
vendor). 64.12% of all deployed OpenSSL versions have more than 10 CVEs. The
complementary CDF of vulnerabilities is presented in Figure 3.3.
One of the least surprising findings of our survey is that most users are running
the OpenSSL version included in their Linux distribution and, in many cases, users
do not keep their Linux installations up to date. We will discuss potential reasons for
this in the next section. Table 3.3 includes a list of three of the most popular Linux
distributions that we found in our crawl as well as the default OpenSSL version that
each shipped with.
We note that many of the most popular OpenSSL versions in Table 3.2 are versions
that shipped in the popular Linux distributions in Table 3.3. This table indicates that
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most of the default OpenSSL versions included in shipping Linux distributions have
several known vulnerabilities. It is important to note that Linux distributions may
patch some of these vulnerabilities on their own, though manufacturers usually do
not patch all vulnerabilities. This is because many vulnerabilities are discovered
after support for a given version is no longer being supported. Our training data is
unable to take these patch levels into account for many distributions (such as Debian).
This is a fundamental limitation of our data set and of the training data available.
As a result, the number of CVEs filed against an OpenSSL version form an upper
bound of how many known vulnerabilities might exist, but in practice the number
of outstanding vulnerabilities could be lower. However, simply discovering the base
version of a particular OpenSSL server raises the possibility of it being vulnerable to
a known attack.
3.5 Discussion
The results of our SSL/TLS case study validate our modular framework and gen-
eral approach for identifying and classifying versions of network protocol implemen-
tations. Because our framework treats the modular components (the URI generator,
feature extractor, and classification algorithms) as black boxes, we can plug in dif-
ferent modules to study other protocol implementations or a different swath of the
Internet with a minimum of effort. In the future, we plan to do exactly this (see
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Section 3.9).
In the rest of this section, we discuss the significance of these results and address
some of the questions that they raise.
3.5.1 Severity of vulnerabilities
Our results indicate that many of the OpenSSL servers on the Internet are vulner-
able to implementation-specific exploits described in CVEs cataloged by the OpenSSL
project. Our first consideration is the severity of the vulnerabilities. Of the 54 vul-
nerabilities, four can lead to remote code execution, fourteen to a DoS and seven
to information leakage. We observe that types of vulnerabilities range in severity
from moderate to catastrophic. We therefore assert that not only are these OpenSSL
servers vulnerable to many of the protocol attacks as described by the SSL Pulse
project111 but that they are also widely unprotected against implementation-specific
attacks that could, in some cases, not only compromise the privacy of an existing SSL
session, but also the security of the underlying server.
3.5.2 Distribution-specific patches
We have also observed that many Linux distributions release package updates in
fixed-length cycles. The versions of all major libraries, including OpenSSL, are fixed
at the end of distribution’s release cycle. This prevents all further package updates,
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including security patches, that the library vendor releases from being automatically
integrated into new builds of the package. If a major vulnerability is discovered
an individual distribution’s package maintainer may elect to backport the patch and
release it as part of a security update for that distribution, but this is not guaranteed.
This process is problematic for several reasons. First, the package maintainers
responsible for backporting patches cannot necessarily provide the level of scrutiny
toward patch as the library maintainers can. Also, many of the CVEs are released
after a distribution has stopped releasing security patches for an outdated, but still
widely deployed release. This results in mission-critical systems being left connected
to the Internet without any ability to receive security patches. To illustrate this
point, our analysis has revealed that Debian Lenny which officially supports OpenSSL
version 0.9.8g is still widely deployed on the Internet. This particular version has 24
known vulnerabilities, 17 of which Debian patched before it discontinued support for
Lenny. The remaining vulnerabilities will never be patched. We found that 0.7%
of all of the servers that we crawled self-reported that they run Lenny in the server
response header. An attacker viewing this information will immediately know that
this server must be running unpatched versions of many libraries and daemons that
may be vulnerable to remote code execution exploits.
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3.5.3 TLS1.1/1.2 deployment
The only OpenSSL branch that supports TLS1.1/1.2 is the OpenSSL 1.0.1 branch,120
which, as shown in Table 3.2 is not widely deployed. We believe that administrators
are hesitant to upgrade to the 1.0.1 branch of OpenSSL because most Linux distri-
butions have not yet released packages for it. To further complicate matters, the
OpenSSL, mod ssl, and Apache versions are interdependent making upgrading one
without the others difficult. These complications prevent many administrators from
upgrading their web server stacks on their own. Since most Linux distributions do
not include the OpenSSL 1.0.1 branch, a large fraction of Apache servers cannot sup-
port the most recent versions of TLS, even if their administrators wanted to. This
observation is corroborated by the SSL Print’s observations of TLS1.2/1.2 market
penetration during the same time period as our crawl111
3.5.4 Case study conclusions and future work
The current state of OpenSSL deployment on the public Internet is not good. By
actively interrogating web servers, our tool discovered close to 62% of web servers
using OpenSSL are running versions which contain known vulnerabilities that are
susceptible to exploitation. This is explained, at least in part, by the fact that many
web server stacks use the default version of OpenSSL provided by the operating
system which can become stale if not kept up-to-date.
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In the future, we plan to explore the nature of biases in our training data by
leveraging additional classification techniques on additional features such as operating
system version. We believe that the additional data labels will provide insight to
our current semi-supervised approach. In addition, we plan to explore avenues for
acquiring better training data for additional TLS implementations.
3.6 Limitations of data
The approach that we use for collecting our training data is a good approach for
fingerprinting OpenSSL implementations but it has several limitations. The major
limitation of our approach comes from our analysis making the assumption that the
observed labels (the OpenSSL version numbers) come from web servers that accu-
rately report them. We believe that this is likely to be the case since Apache pro-
gramatically generates this information when it is run rather than being hard coded
in a configuration file. A hard coded value would run the risk of not being updated
when OpenSSL is updated and thus the server would report old version numbers.
Another concern is that a clever administrator might try to spoof these labels to
throw off would-be attackers. While this is a concern, we did not observe any cases
where observed features did not match the reported OpenSSL version. Additionally,
there is the possibility that our training data may be skewed towards servers that
are configured with default settings or towards servers that are infrequently updated.
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Both concerns can be addressed by starting with a better set of data for which we
have ground truth.
We are also limited by the fact that we are only able to collect training data for
OpenSSL and thus cannot identify other SSL/TLS implementations such as GNU TLS
or Microsoft SChannel. As a result, we were forced to rely on clustering techniques
to identify likely OpenSSL implementations from among the servers we crawled.
This introduces both false positives—that is, SSL/TLS libraries we classify as be-
ing OpenSSL when they are not—and false negatives—throwing out OpenSSL data
points because the clusters do not contain enough labeled instances. Since we again
do not have ground truth, we cannot measure the accuracy of this binning technique.
More complete training data would remove this limitation.
Finally, we were only able to scan web servers on the public Internet. Thus, our
results do not generalize to all OpenSSL deployments such as those on corporate
LANs or behind NAT gateways, an important problem in its own right due to the
presence of malware on these networks resulting from, among other things, bring-
your-own-device corporate cultures.
3.7 Generalizing the approach
We designed SSLPrint using a modular architecture in order to facilitate its usage
in other studies. One particular use case for this functionality is to enable the finger-
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printing of other security protocols. There are a few requirements in doing so. The
primary requirement is that if the default analysis tool and techniques are to be used
then the protocol must have some mechanism of reporting the actual version number
for some percentage of the data. This is necessary because our analysis is contingent
upon supervised learning techniques which require labeled training data. Whether
or not there is a means to collect such data is wholly dependent upon the individual
protocol being analyzed.
We note that the accuracy of SSLPrint may vary when used to analyze a different
protocol since this information is dependent upon the number of features that are
dependent upon the underlying version number of the protocol being analyzed and
on how predictive these features are of this version number. We do note, however,
that SSLPrint will report accuracy data when run. If a given protocol has many
observable features that closely relate to version number then the protocol will be a
good candidate for this sort of analysis.
3.8 Related work examining SSL/TLS
Much of the SSL security research to date considers the quality of certificates
deployed across websites, as well as server-based configuration options. Community
driven projects such as the EFF SSL Observatory and Netcraft SSL Survey have
been erected to provide an in-depth analysis of server certificates on the web. More
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concretely, the EFF SSL Observatory aims to determine the trustworthiness of Cer-
tificate Authorities by investigating multiple features of all server certificates on the
web (e.g., number of certificates signed by an authority).121 The Netcraft SSL Survey
is a monthly data collection service that attempts to identify how online businesses
use encryption to secure their online transactions (i.e., confirming known certificate
usage and deployment).106 In 2012, Heninger et al.122 performed an Internet-scale
analysis of all SSL certificates. The intent of the analysis was to determine how many
servers had weak or insecure key generation mechanisms. The end result was the
startling realization that 5.57% of deployed SSL servers shared an RSA key factor.
In the past few years there have been several high profile attempts to survey
SSL servers that are vulnerable to the known protocol attacks with varying areas of
focus.99,123–125 In contrast, we take an entirely new approach to analyzing the secu-
rity of SSL servers by looking at individual, implementation-specific vulnerabilities
rather than looking for protocol-specific ones. In doing so we classify the OpenSSL
implementations of a large sample of servers and chart these implementations against
known version-specific vulnerabilities for which CVEs exist. We show that a large
percentage of servers are running OpenSSL versions for which there are many un-
patched vulnerabilities. In many cases, these vulnerabilities are severe and in some
cases lead to total privacy breaches or remote code execution.117–119
Finally, recent work attempts to fingerprint SSL library type (e.g., SChannel vs.
OpenSSL) by actively probing TLS handshake responses126 for a list of known error
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responses. While this tool, SSLAudit, can distinguish different libraries, it is not able
to determine library version.
3.9 Conclusions and future work
We have shown that machine learning techniques can be effective as a means
of classifying Internet communication based on the implementations that generated
the traffic. Identifying specific implementations is extremely useful for measuring and
analyzing security. For example, in our case study looking at SSL/TLS, we discovered
that more than 62% of the installations running OpenSSL deployed versions that are
known to be susceptible to published exploits.
Our case study discovered that default configurations are typically maintained,
and we know that these often become stale quickly. Studies such as ours can be
used to identify the prevalence of patch applications on the Internet, and we believe
that our technique can be easily applied to other protocols. We plan to continue to
enhance our machine learning techniques and to implement additional case studies to
study the implementations of other security-sensitive protocols such as SSH or DNS.
One objective of this work is to provide measurement tools that analysts can use to
discover how widely patches have been applied to different software packages. We
also hope our work will provide generic tools for researchers who need to learn about
the use of particular implementations of protocols.
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Chapter 4
Sentinel: Secure Mode Profiling
and Enforcement for Embedded
Systems
4.1 Introduction
With the advent of the Internet of Things, today’s embedded devices have be-
come increasingly connected.127–129 One of the major benefits of this connectivity has
been realized in industrial networks, where device measurements can now be taken
remotely. Gone are the days when technicians would carefully transcribe analog read-
ings produced by disparate equipment onto paper charts. Modern industrial networks
leverage technology in order to minimize the number of times a technician has to in-
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teract with paper or perform a manual reading. Many industrial networks contain a
mix of general-purpose computers and mission-critical embedded devices.130–134
These devices are often installed directly by an agent of the manufacturer or by
field technicians specifically trained by these agents. There are numerous examples of
embedded devices containing special modes that are meant to be used only by these
agents during setup.135,136 Unfortunately, manufacturers still produce devices that
do not have secure default configurations137–139 and in many cases these modes can
also be used by attackers to maliciously reconfigure and attack the device.138,139
In addition to being vulnerable to remote attacks like any other network-facing
device, many embedded systems are also particularly vulnerable to physical attacks
as well. Industrial equipment must often be deployed in the field. In such an envi-
ronment, the equipment owner typically has little control over who interacts with the
devices. Until recently, most manufacturers have focused on reliability and usability
rather than on security. There are many possible negative consequences of an at-
tacker tampering with industrial equipment–the attacker could degrade performance,
tamper with measurements, disable functionality or, in some cases, even cause direct
bodily harm.140,141 Clearly physical security in industrial networks is a serious prob-
lem that does not always receive the attention that it deserves. When we consider
physical attacks in conjunction with remote attacks, we see that many embedded
devices have enormous attack surfaces.
To further complicate matters, many embedded devices are designed to have ex-
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traordinarily long lifespans. For example, a medical infusion pump model might be
supported by its manufacturer for 10–15 years.142 This creates several problems. As
security techniques constantly improve, legacy devices are often left behind. In some
industries, such as healthcare, embedded devices may not even be able to receive soft-
ware upgrades without the update first going through a lengthy and expensive review
process.143 Due to this review process, manufacturers sometimes recommend that a
particular feature not be used without releasing a firmware update that actually re-
moves the mode.144 Furthermore, since industrial devices are designed with longevity
in mind, they are often designed to be sold to as many customers as possible. This
means that the devices often contain a wide variety of modes and features in order
to meet the requirements of all possible customers.
As a result, any particular customer may only use a small subset of the available
features in a given device; in many cases actual usage of the device may fit a very
narrow profile. Despite the extensive work looking at securing embedded devices
against exploits145–155 there has been little work on how to build and enforce security
profiles that cover a device’s typical usage patterns, and how to disable insecure device
features without requiring a firmware update.
This new work would be a useful complement to existing work on defense against
exploits, as it would allow a manufacturer to dramatically reduce the attack surface
on an embedded device by allowing the device to be locked down to a limited profile
after it has been configured. For example, on devices with a configuration mode,
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it would be useful to disable 1 the configuration mode while the device is deployed
in the field if the device should only be reconfigured when it is offline.68 Similarly,
on devices that use interfaces for debugging purposes, it would be useful to disable
these interfaces when the device is not being debugged.156–158 On legacy devices with
telnet access, it may be useful to disable telnet altogether.159–161 Note that these
three examples all come from vulnerabilities reported in actual industrial embedded
devices. Existing exploit mitigation techniques would not adequately address these
issues but a secure device profiler such as Sentinel could.
We address this problem by creating Sentinel, a secure device profiler for embedded
systems. Sentinel significantly increases the physical security of embedded devices by
using a bus tapping interface to derive a partial control flow graph representing a
subset of functionality of the attached embedded system. This control flow graph is
built from device execution traces taken while running the device through the desired
functions. Anything in the control flow graph is considered an allowable action within
the device’s security profile and any action not in the security profile is considered a
security violation.
The partial control flow graphs corresponding to constructed security profiles can
replace a full control flow graph in existing bus snooping-based control flow integrity
techniques145–147 with only minimal modifications in order to detect attempts to access
features not in the deployment profile of the device. Sentinel builds its partial control
1Disabling a device feature is one of several possible mitigation techniques that Sentinel can be
made to support. These techniques are discussed in more detail in Section 4.4.4.
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flow graph by monitoring the memory bus directly. It is therefore a passive observer to
normal device operations. Because of its passive nature, Sentinel is able to accomplish
this auditing without any additional runtime overhead whatsoever. Furthermore,
Sentinel is robust even in the face of lossy data.
We outline a high-level design for an execution-based embedded device profiler.
We prove its feasibility by using it to build a security profile of a particularly important
type of embedded device–a medical infusion pump. We test the utility of the profile
by using it to audit an execution trace taken during a physical attack on the device.
We further outline how we solve difficult problems such as accounting for interrupt
and exception handlers and anticipating instruction prefetches before looking how it
handles lossiness by looking at the relationship between sample size and false positive
rate. Finally, we consider additional uses for Sentinel beyond our novel security
profiling technique.
Threat Model. This work is concerned with attackers that already have some
access to an embedded system. The attackers may be physical or remote. Their goal
is to attempt to access a feature or a mode of the device that is not within its use
profile without detection.
Our Contribution. This work proposes the following significant and novel contri-
butions:
1. Dynamically builds partial control flow graph corresponding to device features
and modes without any knowledge of the underlying source code or firmware
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2. Audits execution traces to ensure that device operated within a given security
profile
3. Assists with disassembly of specific device features and modes
4.2 Related Work
There has been much previous work looking at memory bus monitoring in embed-
ded devices.145–147,162–165 Some of this work has used bus monitoring in conjunction
with other techniques to add security to insecure embedded devices146,162,163 includ-
ing by using a modified compiler to output a full control flow graph to be used in
conjunction with a bus monitor to enforce control flow integrity.145–147
All control-flow related bus monitoring work that we know of has looked at using
the full control flow graph to detect and prevent remote exploits rather than to
limit device functionality. In contrast, our work dynamically builds partial control
flow graphs that encapsulate specific device functionality. These partial control flow
graphs can be enforced as security profiles at runtime or they can be used to audit
device execution in order to ensure that an attached device is operating according to
its expected run-time profile.
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4.2.1 Hardware-Assisted Run-Time Monitoring for
Secure Program Execution on Embedded Pro-
cessors
This work145 is a simulated design for a bus monitoring circuit that can en-
force control-flow integrity on embedded devices in real-time. The design enforces
inter-procedural control flow, intra-procedural control flow, and instruction stream
integrity. Inter-procedural control flow is accomplished by storing all procedures in
function call graph that is translated into a finite-state machine. Whenever the mon-
itor observes a function call it checks to see if the call corresponds to a valid state
transition. Intra-procedural control flow is accomplished through the use of a basic
block table. For each basic block, its two possible successor addresses addresses are
stored (the address of the next basic block depends on whether or not the branch
was taken). Instruction stream integrity is accomplished by also storing the hash of
each basic block in the basic block table, hashing the instruction stream for the basic
block at run-time, and ensuring that the observed hash matches the hash stored in
the table. The described data structures are stored in an enhanced executable and
are loaded into a hardware monitor at run-time.
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4.2.2 A Watchdog Processor to Detect Data and
Control Flow Errors
This work147 proposes a design for a hardware watchdog processor for Motorola
M68040-based embedded devices. The watchdog is used for integrity and reliability
purposes rather than for security. The watchdog is implemented as a custom circuit
that is capable of detecting faults caused by radiations and electromagnetic interfer-
ences. These sorts of faults can cause two types of errors: data errors and control
flow errors. The proposed watchdog processor can thus detect both types of errors.
The watchdog protects against data errors by implementing a bus protection strat-
egy based on Automatic Repeat Request. The watchdog protects against control flow
errors by calculating a signature for each branch free block in the entire binary and
storing the signatures for all blocks offline. At runtime the signature is recomputed
and compared to the stored signature.
4.2.3 Vigilare: Toward Snoop-based Kernel Integrity
Monitor
Vigilare163 is a hardware kernel integrity monitor designed to facilitate integrity
checking on operating system kernels (and hypervisors in particular). Existing hardware-
based integrity monitors used sampling-based bus traffic monitoring schemes due to
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implementation-level difficulties that this work purported to solve. In contrast to
the snapshot-based approaches, Vigilare implements a real-time approach capable of
monitoring all bus-traffic rather than only a limited amount. Vigilare loads the ad-
dresses of important kernel symbols within static regions from the System.map file
and verifies the integrity of the data at these addresses during device runtime by
capturing write operations to these addresses.
4.3 Background
Background knowledge of several key concepts will aid in understanding our so-
lution to the problem of building partial control flow graphs and auditing execution
traces.
4.3.1 Address Space Layout in Embedded Systems
The memory bus is used to transfer data between the CPU and a memory device.
It is composed of three smaller busses: an address bus, a data bus, and a control bus.
The address bus specifies the logical address of the memory to access. The data bus
is used to communicate data to or from the memory device. The control bus is used
to tell the memory controller what type of bus operation is to occur, as well as when
an address or data is latched on the address or data bus, respectively.
Many embedded systems store their firmware on a ROM chip that is directly
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mapped into the address space rather than on a secondary storage such as a hard
drive or solid state drive.166 In such a system the CPU can execute code out of the
ROM by directly loading instructions from its memory addresses. Additionally, these
systems typically contain a RAM that is also mapped to the address space. Typically
RAM and ROM devices use an internal addressing scheme of linear addresses starting
at address 0x0. Thus, linear addresses seen by the CPU must be translated into
physical addresses used to access the data in the physical memory device. A memory
controller translates linear addresses into physical addresses.
4.3.2 Instruction Prefeteching
Almost all modern CPU architectures implement some form of instruction prefetch-
ing167 in order to keep the CPU pipeline filled with instructions. When the CPU
pipeline is empty the CPU must wait for its next instruction to be fetched from main
memory or from cache. This may be a relatively time consuming process. Instruction
prefetching helps to minimize how often the CPU must wait on instructions to be
fetched. One of the earliest architectures to implement instruction prefetching was
the Intel 8086, which could linearly prefetch up to six bytes of instructions.168 More
modern architectures implement significantly more advanced prefetching algorithms
to provide branch prediction169 and branch target prediction.170
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4.3.3 Interrupt Handling
Most CPU architectures support facilities for handling exceptions as well as environment-
triggered inputs, which may be triggered in an unpredictable fashion.171 Such con-
structs are signaled to the CPU externally through an interrupt controller or internally
through a software interrupt. The CPU, upon detecting an exception or an interrupt,
will execute a corresponding handler for the event. The list of all possible handlers is
typically stored as a jump table somewhere in system memory. The precise location
of this interrupt table is architecture–dependent. When interrupts are triggered the
system will choose what to do based on a combination of architectural specification
and system state. The system may ignore certain interrupts or delay their handling,
or it may immediately halt execution and jump to the interrupt handler. In many
cases the interrupt handler will return to the previously-executing code once it has
finished executing. In some cases the interrupt handler may not return at all.
4.3.4 Control Flow Integrity
Control flow integrity is a defense technique that can protect a system against
control flow hijacking attacks such a buffer overflows172 and return-oriented program-
ming.173 Control flow integrity typically protects against such attacks with the use
of a control flow graph generated by the compiler at compile time. The control flow
graph is a graph of all basic blocks and transitions in a program. This graph is used
101
CHAPTER 4. SENTINEL: SECURE MODE PROFILING AND
ENFORCEMENT FOR EMBEDDED SYSTEMS
to generate a state machine. The program execution is then monitored and all control
flow transitions are checked in accordance with the generated state machine. If any
observed control flow transition does not correspond to a transition in the control
flow graph, then the monitor will trigger a security violation and halt the attack.
4.4 Design
Sentinel has been realized as a compound design consisting of two orthogonal
components: a bus tap and a device profiler. The Sentinel bus tap is connected to
an embedded system’s address and control buses. The bus tap forwards the start
and end addresses of all basic blocks fetched by the CPU to the device profiler. It
accomplishes this by monitoring all instruction fetches. If it detects a jump between
basic blocks it forwards the jump source and the jump target to the device profiler.
The jump target represents the first address in a basic block and the jump source
represents the last.
The device profiler receives the list of basic block addresses starting with the ad-
dress of the first basic block fetched by the CPU when the device initially boots. It
uses these basic block addresses to construct a full control flow graph of the observed
device execution. Thus, the device profiler receives device execution traces and con-
structs a control flow graph from them. This control flow graph is, by definition,
sparse because any basic block start address is associated with a single basic block
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end address, and any basic block has exactly two possible successors based on whether
the jump at the end of the block is taken. Thus, the device profiler stores this control
flow graph as an adjacency list.
This partial control flow graph represents a security profile. Any device modes
or features that were accessed during the execution trace will be a part of the secu-
rity profile, and therefore considered allowable accesses during subsequent audits or
enforcement. Conversely, any features or modes not in the security profile will be
considered anomalous accesses. The Sentinel prototype that we have constructed can
audit arbitrary execution traces in order to determine whether or not the execution
trace violates a given security profile. Combined with the control flow based real-time
bus monitors proposed in the prior work145–147 one could enforce Sentinel’s security
profiles on embedded devices in real-time.
Sentinel can either be integrated into existing designs internally or it can be at-
tached to existing hardware externally. Because Sentinel is an open design it can
be easily modified to fit a variety of use cases. In our embodiment, Sentinel is de-
signed to be easily integrated into embedded systems that meet certain architectural
requirements. While it may be possible to modify the Sentinel design to fit into other
types of embedded systems, we will restrict our discussion to cover only the types of
systems into which Sentinel can currently be integrated with no modifications.
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4.4.1 Architectural Requirements
Sentinel can be integrated into any system that meets its architectural require-
ments. The Sentinel device profiler is architecture agnostic as it relies only on the
abstraction provided by the bus tap in order to build the control flow graph. The
Sentinel bus tap, on the other hand, can only be integrated into embedded devices
that meet several basic architectural requirements. In practice these requirements are
minor and most devices that are not system on chip (SoC) should meet them. Even
SoC devices with additional external memory could possibly be made to work with
the Sentinel bus tap in a more limited capacity.
4.4.1.1 External Memory Bus
The bus tap must translate the raw electrical signals that are sent across the
memory bus into an infinite stream of addresses. Therefore, in order to be a candidate
for Sentinel integration, an embedded system must fetch its instructions from external
memory banks such as ROM and/or RAM. If an embedded system were to fetch its
instructions from internal memory banks instead (as would be the case with a system
on chip), Sentinel would have no way to monitor the address and control buses, so
it could not be integrated into the target system. Note that this limitation does not
extend to caches. Sentinel supports caches as it monitors the data path from the
CPU to the system memory. Thus, data will be observed by the Sentinel bus tap as
it fills the cache. Sentinel need not be aware that data is subsequently accessed from
104
CHAPTER 4. SENTINEL: SECURE MODE PROFILING AND
ENFORCEMENT FOR EMBEDDED SYSTEMS
the cache.
Although this external memory requirement appears to prevent Sentinel from
being used with SoC devices with internal memory, this is not entirely true. In many
types of embedded devices, the internal memory on the SoC is limited and is only
used to store a bootloader or some limited subset of the code. The rest of the code
will still be stored on external memory. In these cases the Sentinel bus tap is likely to
work without issue. Since the device we have used for our demo does not have such
an architecture, testing the veracity of this theory is left to future work.
4.4.1.2 CPU Address Bus Control Pins
The bus tap must also be able to differentiate between bus operations in order to
determine when a bus operation corresponds to an instruction fetch. In many archi-
tectures174–177 the CPU signals the type of bus operation requested to the memory
bus controller using a control bus. The bus tap uses this control bus to differentiate
an instruction fetch from any other type of memory bus operation. While Sentinel’s
bus tap implementation is configured to interface with the x86 architecture for the
purposes of our demo, it could be trivially modified to interface with any other ar-
chitecture that exposes memory bus control operations through external signals.
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4.4.2 Integrating Sentinel into Embedded Devices
There are numerous ways in which one could realize the Sentinel architecture
in an actual product design. In one embodiment, we envision the Sentinel bus tap
and device profiler being packaged together on a custom ASIC. This ASIC would sit
between the CPU and memory bus controller. The manufacturer would include a
profiler mode switch inside the device. When set to profile mode the ASIC would
automatically build a new security profile with the desired functionality and it would
store the security profile on an external flash. When set to enforce mode the ASIC
would enforce the stored profile on instruction fetches in real-time. This would protect
the device against physical attacks (such as accessing ”locked” modes) as well as
against exploits (such as return-oriented programming attacks).
4.4.3 Methods of Integration
Sentinel can either be externally wired to existing devices or it can be integrated
into device designs as a custom ASIC. To connect Sentinel to an existing device it
must be wired to the address bus. Alternately Sentinel is designed to be easy to
integrate into new revisions of the printed circuit board (PCB) layout of devices
already in production or to be incorporated into the initial revision of new device
designs. This flexibility allows a design to be retrofitted with Sentinel at minimal
cost. Furthermore if a device design already uses a custom ASIC as a memory bus
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controller, as was the case in several devices at which we looked, then Sentinel can
be integrated directly into this ASIC. Otherwise, Sentinel can be placed between a
CPU and a memory bus controller in order to monitor and audit bus operations.
4.4.4 Failure Modes
If a real-time enforcer were configured to use the Sentinel-generated security pro-
files, the enforcer could be easily designed to take a number of corrective actions in
response to a detected security violation based upon the needs of the specific appli-
cation. In an audit-based implementation, Sentinel would be configured to report all
security violations, while allowing the device to continue executing. This is usually
the safest option to take if we do not know in advance what effects halting execution
might have on a device. However, in some cases halting execution might be superior
to allowing execution to continue. The Sentinel device profiler can be trivially modi-
fied to cause the CPU to immediately stop executing by connecting a security status
output to the reset pin of the attached CPU. In more advanced designs, a corrective
action could additionally be implemented. For example, an administrator might want
to reset the device, disable network interfaces, and restore it to known-good settings
so that it can continue executing in an offline-mode. For many embedded devices,
Sentinel enforcers could easily be constructed to fit any of these use cases.
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4.5 Implementation
In our prototype embodiment we have externally connected our Sentinel to a
popular Intel 80C188-based177 embedded device. We prototyped our bus tap on an
FPGA and our security enforcer on a Linux workstation. The Sentinel bus tap is
designed to be directly wired to the address pins and bus control pins of the 80C188.
The bus tap observes all instruction fetches and captures the start and end addresses
for each basic block that is executed. The bus tap then forwards these addresses to the
security enforcer running on the Linux workstation over USB 2.0. On the workstation
our device profiler prototype builds a control flow graph taken from concatenated
execution traces and it enforces this profile on a captured execution trace. The
device profiler algorithm runs in sub-real-time due to bandwidth constraints of our
FPGA’s development libraries. In a full-hardware ASIC realization this sub-real-time
limitation would not exist.
4.5.1 Intel 80C188 Architecture
The Intel 80C188 is an 80186-based 16-bit x86 CPU with an 8-bit wide data bus.
The 80C188XL contains 20 address pins, an address latch and three bus cycle status
information pins. The bus cycle status information pins shown in Table 4.1177 are
used to announce the type of bus operation currently in progress. The real-time
bus monitor is wired directly to these bus cycle status information pins. Using this
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information combined with the Address Latch Enable (ALE#) pin, the bus monitor
is able to decode address bus operations.
4.5.2 Bus Tap
We prototyped the Sentinel bus tap on an Opal Kelly XEM3010-1500 FPGA. This
FPGA contains a USB 2.0 interface and a high-speed I/O bus which we connect to
the target device through an attached breakout header. The bus tap is wired to the
address and control pins and forwards all bus traffic of a chosen type over its USB
2.0 interface to a computer for analysis. The bus tap is wired to the address, bus
control and address latch enable pins on the 80C188. The FPGA samples the values
of these pins continuously at 133Mhz. When the address latch is active (low) and
the bus control pins denote that an instruction fetch is occurring on the data bus the
bus tap saves the corresponding address from which the current instruction is being
fetched. The bus tap requires that an address is valid for three sample-cycles in order
to minimize the number of potential errors caused by electrical noise, crosstalk and
loose wires.
If the address is stable for three cycles the bus tap checks to see if the address
is contiguous to the last valid address that it captured (e.g. if currentaddress =
previousaddress + 1). If the addresses are contiguous it increments the previous
address and continues to the next address. If the addresses are not contiguous then
the bus tap will have captured the end of a basic block (e.g. the previous address)
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and the beginning of a new basic block (e.g.) the next address. This implies a control
flow change in the program from the previous basic block to the new basic block.
The bus tap stores both of these addresses in a FIFO queue to await transfer to the
security enforcer.
The fact that we are not storing contiguous blocks in the FIFO is an optimization
to significantly increase throughput. Rather than transmitting contiguous addresses
over the USB 2.0 interface we can instead transmit block boundaries. Since the x86
architecture always begins executing at address 0xFFFF0 the receiving computer can
always determine whether it is receiving the start address or the end address for a
basic block. This is important for reasons that will be described in our discussion of
the implementation of the device profiler.
4.5.3 Device Profiler
The Sentinel device profiler receives a list basic block boundaries corresponding
to a device execution and uses this execution trace to build a control flow graph of
the associated functionality of the attached embedded system. The device profiler
enforces both inter-procedural and intra-procedural control-flow constraints. Our
implementation is complicated by two issues: instruction prefetching and interrupt
handling. We have solved both of these issues in our x86-specific reference imple-
mentation and our solutions are generic; they can be applied to most architectures.
We have also considered architectures that utilize branch-prediction and out-of-order
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execution even though our 80C188 CPU did not have these features.
The Sentinel device profiler is fed a concatenated set of execution traces taken from
the embedded device as it is run through its normal operations. The profiler tracks the
start and end addresses for all basic blocks in each execution trace. For each address,
it records the immediately preceding address as a valid possible predecessor address.
That is, (previous block end, current block start) and (current block start, current block end)
are recorded as valid jumps in the table, capturing both inter-procedural and intra-
procedural control-flow. Thus the jump table forms an adjacency list representing the
full control-flow graph of addresses of the instructions that fall within the security
profile. Basic block boundaries are shown in more detail in Figure 4.1
In addition to the aggregated execution traces corresponding to the security pro-
file, our device profiler is also fed a target execution trace on which to enforce the
security profile. The device profiler checks to see if every control flow change in the
target execution trace is also in the jump table corresponding to the security profile.
In the event that the control-flow change is not in the security profile the Sentinel se-
curity enforcer outputs a security violation. The Sentinel security profiler will detect
any unexpected control flow changes including control-flow changes caused by device
errors, by a user accessing modes that are not in the security profile or by control-flow
hijacking malware attacks (such as buffer overflows or many types of return-oriented
programming attacks).
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4.5.3.1 Instruction Prefetching
The Intel 80C188 CPU is capable of prefetching up to four bytes to help keep
the CPU’s pipeline full. This prefetching would cause problems with our security
algorithms described above. In particular, the end address that we observe for a
given basic block may not be the actual end of the block–it may actually be up to
four bytes past the block boundary. Thus prefetching introduces a small amount of
non-determinism into the system. In order to account for this nondeterminism in the
system, we must allow for nondeterminism in our enforcement. Thus, to account for
the prefetching we allowed for a margin of error of +/- 4 bytes in a block boundary.
In a system meant to enforce strict control-flow requirements such as a CFI-based
exploit mitigation method, this margin of error could possibly have a slight effect on
the overall security of the system 2. However, since the purpose of Sentinel is instead
to profile and enforce mode constraints on an embedded device, this nondeterminism
does not significantly weaken the underlying security of our system 3.
4.5.3.2 Interrupt Handling
Upon considering the security profiling algorithm above it should be clear that
an obvious problem is how to account for control flow jumps generated by interrupts
2Though this has not been established and indeed would have have to be evaluated in order to
make a determination one way or the other
3In order to understand why this is true consider the fact that to use prefetching-based nonde-
terminism to properly profile an invalid device mode as it profiles a valid device mode, the improper
mode would need to be split into chunks that each fall within a maximum of n bytes of the end of
a basic block where n is the maximum number of bytes that the CPU architecture can prefetch.
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and exceptions.
When an interrupt is triggered on the target system the bus tap will detect a
jump to the interrupt. This means that the bus tap will insert a basic block bound-
ary immediately before the interrupt start address in the instruction stream. This
boundary does not correspond to an actual block boundary in the software’s basic
block graph but instead is caused by the interrupt splitting the block. Similarly, an
interrupt return is followed by another block boundary where the profiler begins exe-
cuting again. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2. From an enforcement perspective, this
means that jumping to or returning from an interrupt or exception should generate
two consecutive violations. Thus, we can relax the restrictions on our enforcement
algorithm to allow for this particular case without significantly compromising our
goals. Since we are trying to disable manufacturer-implemented features and device
modes rather than enforce control-flow integrity (which is an already-solved problem)
we can assume that in almost all cases any useful device mode or feature that we
might be interested in restricting access to would contain more than two basic blocks.
Thus we can handle arbitrary interrupts without any knowledge of the underlying
system and without compromising security under our threat model.
In some cases we may have access to the interrupt table (e.g. through a firmware
update image). In this case we can restrict the above algorithm to only allow for
jumps to known interrupts. This will make false negatives in the system even less
likely than in the general case. In an x86 binary image this table is located at
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addresses 0x00000—0x00400. From this table we can obtain the base address of all
interrupt and exception handlers. We can then search the binary for the opcode of
all iret instructions. Once we have lists of all interrupts and interrupt returns we can
combine these lists to form our list of interrupt boundaries 4. Every time we detect a
control flow change we first check if it’s an interrupt boundary (an interrupt start or
end address). If so we skip enforcement on the previous, current and next addresses.
We then continue executing normally so that we may profile the code within the
interrupts. In summary, if we know the interrupt table we can restrict our algorithm
to only allow for unprofiled jumps to or from known interrupt-boundary addresses.
4.5.3.3 Branch Prediction and Branch Target Prediction
Some advanced architectures utilize branch prediction and branch target predic-
tion in order to improve performance. Although Sentinel has not been tested on such
architectures, we believe that it should support them with extremely minor mod-
ifications. Because Sentinel, in its current implementation, allows two consecutive
invalid jumps before it flags a mode as suspicious, a missed branch prediction should
not trigger an alert. However, we have not tested this and it is conceivable an alert
may be triggered if an interrupt occurs after the CPU has fetched instructions for a
predicted branch that isn’t in the profile that Sentinel is enforcing. This could be
remedied by allowing for one additional level of indirection before triggering an alert
4This combination is a convenience for ease of implementation. There is no technical reason why
interrupt start and end addresses could not be handled separately for slightly greater accuracy.
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Bus Cycle Initiated S2# S1# S0#
Interrupt Acknowledge 0 0 0
Read I/O 0 0 1
Write I/O 0 1 0
Halt 0 1 1
Instruction Fetch 1 0 0
Read Data from Memory 1 0 1
Write Data to Memory 1 1 0
Passive (no bus cycle) 1 1 1
Table 4.1: Bus Cycle Status Information (Reproduced from Intel 80C188XL
Datasheet).
(e.g. by allowing three consecutive invalid jumps before triggering an alert). Testing
this has been left for future work.
4.5.3.4 Out-of-Order Execution
Many modern CPU architectures contain advanced performance optimizations
such as out-of-order execution. Although the 80C188 that we tested our Sentinel
prototype on did not contain these features, we believe that Sentinel already supports
most out-of-order execution implementations as-is. This is a corollary to the already-
existing cache support included in Sentinel. In out-of-order execution, the CPU
fetches instructions in program order and stores them in a cache.178 The CPU then
pulls instructions from the cache in an optimized order. Thus the out-of-order step
occurs after the instruction fetch from memory. Since Sentinel concerns itself only
with instruction fetches that occur outside of the CPU, out-of-order execution should
have no impact on Sentinel at all.
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Figure 4.1: Example of how a raw bus capture (left) is split into basic blocks (right).
Figure 4.2: Example of how interrupts split a basic block.
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4.6 Evaluation
We evaluate the Sentinel architecture by proving its real-world efficacy in detecting
a physical attack on an embedded medical device. The process for this evaluation is
as follows:
1. Create security profile
2. Enforce security profile
3. Access mode not defined in profile
4. Detect attack in execution trace
4.6.1 Alaris SE Infusion Pump
We evaluate the Sentinel architecture by connecting our working prototype to a
popular embedded medical device. For our test implementation, we have selected the
Alaris Signature Edition (SE) Infusion Pump due to its popularity and its x86-based
architecture. We looked at two different board layouts for the Alaris SE. The Alaris
SE contains an Intel 80C188-based177 processor (or, in some revisions, the AMD equiv-
alent), a custom ASIC for address encoding/decoding and data bus multiplexing, and
either an Intel E28F800-CVT70179 flash memory or an STM M27C801 UV EPROM.
In board revisions that contain the Intel E28F800 the manufacturer added a header
to emulate the pin layout of the STM M27C801 as shown in Figure 4.3. When de-
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scribing information that is pertinent to both chips we will subsequently use the term
ROM. The Intel EF2800-based Alaris pump contains an undocumented programming
mode (discovered through reverse engineering) that can be entered by applying +5V
to the VCC pin on the programming header and connecting the GND pin to the
ground source. The STM M27C801-based pumps contain a socketed EPROM that
can be read using a standard universal flash programmer. We dumped the firmware
from the STM M27C801 by using a flash programmer to receive a binary image of
firmware version 2.79.
The Alaris SE logic board also contains a 128K battery-backed SRAM to which
some code is copied at boot and in which persistent settings are stored. The Intel
80C188 is capable of addressing up to 1MB of memory. The onboard ROM is 1MB
and thus occupies the entire address space. The SRAM overlays the memory region
beginning with address 0x3D000. Upon system boot the device first copies 6144B of
data from 0xFD000 to 0x3D000 before jumping to 0x3D000 where it begins executing.
4.6.2 Connecting the Bus Tap
We connected our bus tap to the infusion pump by soldering wires to each address
pin, the CPU bus control pins (S0, S1 and S2) and the ALE# pin. Our particular
infusion pump selectively enabled the ROM or the SRAM through the use of chip
enable pins wired from the ASIC to the respective chips. The address pins connected
to both the ROM and the SRAM through the ASIC and used in conjunction with the
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chip enable pin could be used to send and address to either the ROM or the SRAM.
The address pins wired to both of these chips always showed the same addresses as
the address pins on the CPU. Thus to simplify the soldering we actually soldered our
wires to the address pins connected to the ROM rather than to the CPU as shown in
Figure 4.4.
4.6.3 Error Correction
Due to the requirement that the bus tap interface only send valid addresses, the
bus tap will occasionally drop an address if an error occurs. When this happens in
the middle of a block, the bus tap will see two noncontiguous addresses and think
that a jump has occurred. If it happens at the beginning of a block the bus tap
will start the block one address after the actual starting address of the block. If it
happens at the end of a block the bus tap will end the block one address before the
actual ending address of the block (which may or may not be the real ending address
because prefetching makes this impossible to discern). We have trivially handled each
of these errors in software.
In our test implementation, we did not implement reliable delivery over our bus
tap interface due to overhead in our FPGA libraries. Even without reliable delivery
we were able to reliably build and enforce profiles. The lack of reliable delivery did
affect profile building but it had no impact on profile enforcement. Indeed, in our
tests, different device modes looked so different from the perspective of our enforcer
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# of Samples in Profile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
# Errors in Control Sample 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
# Errors in Experimental Sample 9250 9220 9049 8705 8374 8367 8365 8358
Table 4.2: Relationship between number of samples in profile, false positives, and
detection accuracy.
that it was easy to distinguish between them. Similarly, despite the lossy interface
we were able to build enforceable profiles with low false positive rates with just one
sample, and we were able to build enforceable profiles with no false positives at all by
the time we reached five samples. Thus, by profiling a device during typical use over
a short period of time we can build reliable and enforceable profiles even with respect
to lossy interfaces. This means that in practice a bus monitor can be significantly
weaker than the system it is attached to, thus lowering the overall cost.
4.6.4 Enforcing a Profile
To demonstrate the efficacy of our Sentinel platform we use it to build a profile
of a normal device booting and navigating to the ”Infuse” screen where a healthcare
provider can configure infusion rate and amount and start an infusion. We intention-
ally build the profile to not include the ”Options” screen. Thus, if a user accesses the
options screen this should be flagged as a security violation. We show that we are
able to build an enforceable profile with no false positives after just three sample.
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4.6.4.1 Testing the Profile
In order to test the efficacy of enforcing a security profile we took eight execution
traces each containing 8,388,608 addresses. The execution traces consisted of the
addresses of all basic block boundaries observed by our bus monitor while we booted
the pump to the ”Infuse” screen. We also took a ninth execution trace of the device
booting to the ”Infuse” screen to use as an experimental control. Our test case
consisted of the first 8,388,608 basic block boundary addresses observed by our bus
monitor while we booted the pump to the ”Infuse” screen and then navigated to
the ”Options” menu. Note that in all cases parts of the data corresponding to some
screens were null due to data loss through our system.
We created eight profiles to enforce by concatenating up to eight execution traces
together. For example, profile one contained execution trace one, test case two con-
tained execution traces one and two, test case three contained execution traces 1-3
and so on. We enforced each profile on our control sample and on our experimental
sample. In our control sample we would expect to see no security exceptions since
we are enforcing our ”Infuse” profile on an ”Infuse” test case. In the experimental
sample we would expect to see numerous security exceptions since we are enforcing
the ”Infuse” profile while the user accesses an unprofiled device mode. The results of
our experiment confirm our hypotheses and are reflected in Table 4.2.
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4.6.4.2 Discussion
From our results we see that our method of capturing partial execution traces can
be used to reliably differentiate between device modes and to enforce profiles. We see
that in the control test we had a few initial false positives but that the number of
false positives quickly decreased to zero as we added more samples to our profile.
We also observed that we were immediately able to differentiate between our con-
trol and experimental test cases even with just one experimental sample in our profile.
As we concatenated more samples to build our profile the number of false positives
quickly dropped. After combining four samples into a profile all false positives not
caused by physical errors had been eliminated. Thus, our results imply that only a
few samples are needed in order to successfully profile a given device feature. Further-
more, accessing a ”locked” device mode generated several orders of magnitude more
security errors than accessing a profiled device mode and thus even if we had not
combined multiple samples to build a device profile we still could have distinguished
between the control and experimental cases with high accuracy.
4.6.4.3 Automation Through Keypad Emulation
Because we have shown that building accurate profiles is best accomplished by
combining multiple samples, we devised a method for automatically generating sam-
ples by emulating keypad inputs on our Alaris SE infusion pumps.
In order to differentiate key presses, the host device typically uses a microcontroller
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to poll the button rows in sequence. When a key is pressed, the microcontroller reads
from the column output and derives the button location in the matrix. When no keys
are pressed, there is no output on the column lines. When a key is pressed, one of
the column lines will go high and the microcontroller can determine the individual
button based on the row it was polling.
The Alaris SE uses 24 buttons. The row and column lines are fed to the host
device through two 8-pin FFC (Flexible Flat Cable) cables. In order to access these
lines, we soldered hookup wires to the the mount points on the FFC connectors on
the underside of the PCB. Using a logic analyzer, we reverse-engineered the electri-
cal signals corresponding to various keypresses. Since buttons in the same column
trigger output on the same line, the first step was to map out the complete button
layout to determine which pins corresponded to column lines. The row lines were
trivial to ascertain with the logic analyzer since the microcontroller polls were clearly
evident. We found the column lines by pressing each button and observing which line
responded. Using this process we discovered that there were five row lines and seven
column lines. The remaining lines were unused.
Once each button’s column was known its corresponding row was discovered by
comparing the output signal to one of the five possible inputs. Since holding down
a button will result in the exact signal output as one of the inputs, this process was
simply done through direct comparison and was exhaustively applied to determine
the matrix location of each button. Once complete, it was possible to wire a given row
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Figure 4.3: Board Layout of the Alaris SE 7132. Redundant SRAM chips on left,
CPU top-middle, flash between header pins, ASIC top-right.
to a column and force the microcontroller to interpret a button press. This enabled
external command of the keypad interface without physically pressing buttons.
Using GPIO on a Raspberry Pi we replaced desirable buttons by wiring their
corresponding row and column lines through a relay. We used a script to activate
buttons in sequence, allowing for total control over the device interface.
4.7 Additional Capabilities
In addition to the device profiling capabilities already outlined, our Sentinel pro-
totype also includes several other important and useful features that are a corollary
to the fact that we have completely separated the implementation of the bus tap and
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Figure 4.4: Image of Sentinel Security Profiler attached to an Alaris SE 7100 Infu-
sion Pump.
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device profiler. Since our bus tap forwards all basic block data to a workstation for
analysis, we have written a number of tools to use this data for a variety of other
security related tasks.
4.7.1 Address Writer
The most basic tool that we wrote is the Sentinel address writer. The address
writer simply writes an arbitrary number of captured addresses to a file. The address
writer was used extensively in debugging the bus monitor and in understanding the
operation of our infusion pump. In one case we were able to use the address writer
combined with manual analysis of the firmware image to discover an interrupt not
listed in the interrupt table. Without this insight we would not have been able to get
the enforcement algorithm to work with our infusion pump.
4.7.2 Assisted Disassembly
To assist with disassembly of the specific functionality of interest, we modified our
bus tap to begin capturing when we pressed a switch. We were then able to begin cap-
turing addresses immediately before activating the device functionality corresponding
to the disassembly that we were interested in viewing. We wrote a corresponding
utility that turns address streams into IDAPython180 scripts that automatically dis-
assemble all basic blocks observed during the capture. One challenge of assisted
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disassembly is syncing to the start of basic blocks. This is a challenge because the de-
vice is already running when the switch is pressed. This means that the first address
could either be the beginning address or the end address of a basic block.
To solve this seemingly troublesome issue we alternated between every address,
splitting them into two groups. We then did a frequency count of the number of
interrupt start addresses per group. We ignored the interrupts that were placed
immediately after iret instructions because we cannot distinguish between whether
this is an interrupt return or an interrupt start due to prefetching. The group that
had more interrupt start addresses was deemed to be the group of basic block entry
addresses.
4.7.3 Assisted Fuzzing
Our security enforcer prints all addresses not in the security profile. This infor-
mation is useful for assisting in the fuzzing process to find device vulnerabilities. We
can use this information as part of our fuzzing process as it allows us to automatically
fuzz input vectors on our devices and then manually determine if a particular crash is
exploitable. Thus, by running a fuzzer in conjunction with enforcing a liberal security
policy we can semi-automate the process of vulnerability discovery on a given device.
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4.8 Future Work
This work opens up several additional avenues for future research questions to
explore and extend upon.
4.8.1 FPGA Implementation
Sentinel’s current prototype implementation works with execution traces rather
than infinite address streams. If we were to implement the Sentinel security profiler
on an FPGA it could be used as a real-time bus monitor. It would be able to
detect and handle violations as they occur and it could be shown to prevent malware
attacks in addition to physical attacks. This would be a worthwhile extension to
the platform that would further increase its usefulness. Although malware detection
using address bus monitoring has been done previously, using it in conjunction with
partial control flow graphs would be an interesting exercise that could allow us to
study the relationship between graph coverage of a security profile and that profile’s
malware protection capabilities.
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4.8.2 Testing Out-of-Order Execution and Branch
Prediction
Because the 80C188XL found in our test device does not support features such as
branch prediction or out-of-order execution we were not able to test our out-of-order
execution algorithm in practice. We believe that this would be a useful exercise as
it would improve confidence in our algorithm and definitively open up Sentinel to a
new class of devices. Testing the algorithm would require a new device, and a bus tap
implemented on an FPGA capable of transferring data at higher speeds than that of
our bandwidth-limited USB 2.0 prototype 5.
4.8.3 Observational Study
In this work, we have shown the feasibility of using bus captures to build and
enforce execution profiles on embedded devices. It would be interesting to study these
execution profiles in practice. Future work could look at the impact of connecting
Sentinels to embedded devices deployed in a variety of settings. We could then study
how often devices deviated from their execution profiles in typical use cases and
could thus derive an understanding of applications for which Sentinel would be well-
suited and for which applications Sentinel would be poorly suited given that Sentinel’s
5In our prototype, bandwidth was further limited by the significant overhead that the USB
library produced by the FPGA manufacturer introduced into the system. This was acceptable for
our low-speed application but would cause problems in a higher-speed system.
129
CHAPTER 4. SENTINEL: SECURE MODE PROFILING AND
ENFORCEMENT FOR EMBEDDED SYSTEMS
enforcement model depends on having a predictable and inclusive execution profile.
4.9 Conclusion
Sentinel is a useful and practical tool for utilizing bus captured execution traces
to build partial control flow graphs of embedded devices. These control flow graphs
can be used to audit execution traces of embedded devices in order to detect physical
attacks. The Sentinel platform can be attached to existing devices with no modifi-
cations to the underlying design. We have shown our bus monitoring technique to
be effective in actually building partial control flow graphs and we have used it to
successfully detect physical attacks on a popular legacy model of infusion pump. In
the future, this work could lead to ASIC-implemented hardware co-processors that
can be used to secure legacy embedded devices by enforcing limited-use device profiles







Tracking and managing assets in real-time is critical for large organizations. For
example, in hospitals, “more than one third of nurses spend at least 1 hour per shift
searching for equipment and the average hospital owns 35,000 inventory SKUs and
utilization hovers around 32-48%, with nearly $4,000 of equipment per bed, lost or
stolen each year”.181 Moreover, tracking needs to be secure; specifically, it needs to be
resilient to active and passive attacks that aid in the misappropriation of assets. We
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implement a real-time tracking system using low-cost Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
devices that provide authenticated wireless communication to securely track assets
and people.
Assets in our system are tracked with a device that can receive BLE transmissions1
and transmit on common media such as Wi-Fi. To provide location information, we
implement Beacon+: a BLE device that extends the design of Apple’s popular iBea-
con specification182 by modifying the advertisement, or unidirectional broadcast, to
contain a monotonically increasing sequence number and CBC-MAC tag. The se-
quence number provides temporal freshness that is resilient to clock skew without
requiring synchronization, and the CBC-MAC tag authenticates the Beacon+ to a
trusted server over a potentially untrusted link (e.g., smartphone). Specifically, the
trusted server validates the authenticity of Beacon+ advertisements and updates lo-
cation data about the tracked assets using the absolute location of each Beacon+.
We use the real-time tracking system coupled with Beacon+ as a foundation for
other applications such as access control that enforces location-based restrictions,
which we implement. This application relies on the authenticity of received Beacon+
advertisements to compute the relative location to an asset and provides access to
asset data if and only if the accessor (i.e., person whom requires the data) is within
close physical proximity. Location here is only one factor in a multi-factor access
control scheme to authenticate a user. For example, in the context of a hospital,
1Some assets support BLE and therefore do not require an additional device.
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nurses and doctors who are away from their personal computer but moving around
with a hospital-issued tablet must login to the tablet with their credentials and be
within close physical proximity of a patient to access her medical record.
Access control that enforces location-based restrictions is novel in that it addresses
the threat of a single authorized device being compromised or stolen to access a large
portion of private asset data. That is, an attacker must be physically present to
obtain a fraction of the private data rather than simply gaining access to everything
on the device.
We also use the real-time tracking system to describe an indoor navigation ap-
plication using Beacon+. Specifically, a user’s smartphone forwards authenticated
advertisements to a backend server that calculates the user’s position and pushes
location data to be displayed on a map. Active spoofing or injection can be used
to misguide navigation; however, Beacon+’s authenticated advertisements mitigate
these attacks.
The linchpin of our applications is Beacon+, and to build a more secure and in-
teroperable Beacon+ we require the following capabilities: (1) perform symmetric
key operations; (2) modify advertisement fields; (3) transmit unidirectional adver-
tisements; and (4) retain traditional beacon (e.g., iBeacon) advertisement structure.
We are aware of only one similar, authenticated beacon called Trusted Beacon.183
Beacon+ differs from Trusted Beacon in its choice of cryptographic primitive and
number of advertisements for a single transmission. Specifically, Trusted Beacon
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lacks capabilities (1), (2) and (4).
Trusted Beacon uses a 320-bit asymmetric RSA private key to sign a random
value that is transmitted via multiple advertisements and is valid for 5 minutes. The
requirement of multiple advertisements is the result of having a signature that is longer
than the message to be signed, and thus does not conform to the iBeacon specification.
In contrast, Beacon+ uses a 128-bit symmetric AES key to compute a CBC-MAC
tag on a monotonically increasing sequence number that fits in a single advertisement
and is only valid for 1 second. Beacon+ conforms to the iBeacon standard and is
compatible with BLE applications that interact with beacons. Furthermore, Trusted
Beacon’s chosen private key size is small and thus easily breakable.184,185
For ease of implementation and testing, we prototyped Beacon+ using a TI
MSP430 Launchpad and BLE BoosterPack (see Section 5.4). The Launchpad provides
non-volatile storage and additional computational resources that we use to maintain
state and perform symmetric key operations. The BLE BoosterPack exposes an in-
terface to broadcast BLE advertisements with our modified fields. This prototype
satisfies the required capabilities listed above.
Our contribution. In this work we implement Beacon+, a BLE device that trans-
mits short-range unspoofable, authenticated advertisements. We implement a real-
time tracking system that uses Beacon+ to more securely track assets and provides
a foundation for other applications. We describe a real-time indoor navigation ap-
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plication, and design and implement a novel application that provides location-based
restrictions on access control. Lastly, we validate the feasibility of our Beacon+ pro-
totype with respect to accuracy and cost.
5.2 Background
Privacy and access control has been an area of concern for years. While there has
been prior work in protocol design for location-based access control ,186–188 there has,
to the best of our knowledge, been little work done regarding the implementation
and evaluation of these suggested protocols. Although existing solutions have had
varying levels of success using RFID,189,190 GPS,191 and WiFi181 to track and manage
assets based on location, Bluetooth beacons are able to accomplish this task in a
more straightforward, efficient and cost-effective fashion. In this section, we will
explore the functionality of these other technologies, and discuss how their limitations
necessitated the invention of Beacon+.
5.2.1 Radio Frequency Identification
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)192 was originally designed for short-range
asset tracking. RFID consists of tags and readers. RFID readers interrogate tags and
receive unique identifiers along with other data. RFID tags can be either passive or
active. Passive RFID tags are powered entirely by the signal transmitted from an
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RFID reader and are thus computationally limited in their abilities. An active RFID
tag is powered externally which allows for more computational power than a passive
tag, yet also makes it more expensive. RFID readers are typically placed at ingress
and egress points of a particular set of areas.193 The readers then read all RFID tags
entering or leaving the monitored area. Thus, RFID is typically used to track assets
in warehouses or to monitor assets as they flow through a supply chain.
The typical communication range for RFID is limited to tens of centimeters.194
Different bands of RFID communication (low frequency, high frequency, ultra high
frequency) can increase the range up to 12 meters.194 However, higher frequency
RFID requires expensive antennas to extend the range. Deploying these expensive
antennas throughout an extensive area such as a hospital is impractical.
5.2.2 Global Positioning System
Global Positioning System (GPS)195 was devised as a reliable global satellite sys-
tem for providing time and location information to any receiver with a clear view of
at least four satellites. GPS satellites broadcast a pre-defined pseudorandom number
stream that is used by the receiver to calculate a time of arrival (TOA). Satellites
also broadcast a time of transmission (TOT) and a position. The receiver uses the
TOA, TOT and position information from four satellites to compute its own x, y and
z coordinates and clock drift compared to satellite time.196
GPS is well-suited to outdoor tracking applications, but it does not function well
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when there is no direct line of sight to at least four satellites. Thus, GPS is generally
not suitable for establishing indoor positioning196,197 because it is often not accurate
enough within buildings.
5.2.3 Wi-Fi
Wi-Fi198 was devised as a means to facilitate wireless networking over mid-ranged
distances. In business and university campuses, multiple wireless access points are
often used to provide coverage to the entire area; specifically, access points are con-
nected to the same underlying network and positioned such that each access point
covers a certain area, seamlessly handing off clients to its neighbors as clients move
throughout the area of coverage.199 These access points each have unique identifiers
that are tied to specific locations. Therefore, an administrator could, in theory, track
the location of individual clients on the wireless network by observing the order and
location in which the clients connect with access points over a given time period. In
fact, several companies200 have begun manufacturing inexpensive Wi-Fi tags that can
be attached to objects to track where the objects are in relation to base stations.
Wi-Fi communication meets the accuracy, timeliness, and communication range
requirements for indoor position management and tracking. Indeed, previous work
has looked at using Wi-Fi tags for exactly this puporse.201 One of the benefits of Wi-
Fi-based solutions is easy adoption; Wi-Fi tags are simply attached to devices or staff,
and communicate with existing access points. However, adhesive Wi-Fi tags are not
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securely integrated with the devices they manage (and in fact may not fit on smaller
devices). Tags can be mixed up or maliciously removed, compromising tracking ac-
curacy. In addition, Wi-Fi is not as power efficient as other wireless technologies,
requires a layer of management (e.g., password, SSIDS, etc.), and requires bidirec-
tional communication, which introduces a more sophisticated adversarial model than
unidirectional beacons. For example, an adversary can continuously communicate
with the Wi-Fi device, attempting to authenticate and gain access.
5.2.4 Near Field Communication
Near field communication (NFC)202 was invented for extremely short-range com-
munication, on the order of several inches. Therefore, for the applications considered
in this work, NFC is infeasible, as it would require an unreasonable number of NFC
devices.
5.2.5 Bluetooth
Bluetooth203 is a short-range communication protocol found in mobile devices and
computers. Bluetooth was originally designed to allow computing devices to commu-
nicate with peripherals wirelessly.204 Bluetooth-enabled devices initiate connections
to host devices by entering discoverable mode and waiting for a scanning device to
make a connection inquiry. The device then responds to the connection inquiry by
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sending information including a device name and a device class. If the host chooses
to connect to the client device then the two devices go through a pairing process to
establish a bond.205
Bluetooth technology has been used in the past to build tracking systems.206–210
Previous work using Bluetooth technology has generally used older Bluetooth versions
(older than v4.0) and did not consider security as a design goal. Some tracking systems
had the tracked entities establish connections with Bluetooth infrastructure devices
(similar in functionality to our beacons), resulting in two-way communication with
potentially untrusted entities, which could lead to compromises.209 Other tracking
systems210 require that the infrastructure devices have a dedicated power supply and
a connection to a LAN or Wi-Fi network, conflicting with our lightweight design goals
(e.g., low cost and battery usage), and adding other potential security vulnerabilities.
Beacons. Bluetooth has gone through many revisions and extensions since its initial
inception. One such extension is Bluetooth low energy (BLE), which was originally
introduced by Nokia in 2004211 and integrated into the Bluetooth 4.0 standard in
2010.212,213 BLE uses significantly less power than classic Bluetooth and BLE devices
can advertise information to a host device without requiring the host device to pair.
Conceptually, BLE is similar to NFC, but it is capable of operating at much longer
ranges than NFC. BLE is designed to be integrated into devices, such as sensors,
that need to broadcast small snippets of data at irregular intervals. Due to these
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advantages, BLE has been widely adopted in many Internet of Things (IoT) enabled
devices.
One particularly useful implementation of BLE technology is beacons, which are
inexpensive BLE devices (in the range of $5214 to $30215) that broadcast a fixed unique
identifier, similar to NFC tags. Beacon identifiers are interpreted by applications and
are used for a variety of purposes. Beacons can broadcast their identifier over a
spectrum of distances (where the distance is typically proportional to the cost of the
Beacon).
Beacon+ is based off of the iBeacon protocol, which is a popular beacon imple-
mentation designed by Apple and used by a variety of vendors in their beacons.216
iBeacons advertise their frames at fixed intervals. The frame is composed of the
following fields:216
• UUID: a sixteen byte unique number used to identify all iBeacons in a particular
deployment.
• Major: a two-byte number used to distinguish groups of iBeacons within a
deployment from other groups.
• Minor: a two-byte string used to distinguish individual iBeacons in a given
group from the other beacons in that group.
Although previous work has looked at using Beacons for indoor tracking,217–222 the
insecurity of the iBeacon protocol makes it poorly suited for this task in the presence
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We describe Beacon+ as having unspoofable, temporal and authenticated adver-
tisements; as such, we recognize the following security goals specific to Beacon+.
1. Integrity. Advertisements should not be modifiable by an unauthorized entity.
2. Availability. Advertisements should be accessible.
We omit confidentiality because Beacon+ advertisements contain no private data.
Moreover, we do not claim any privacy goals for Beacon+ as the application of track-
ing inherently relinquishes the privacy of an asset or person.
Adversaries are distinguished based on their goals, capabilities, and relation to
Beacon+. Thus, we have the following classification criteria.
1. Active/Passive Adversary. Active adversaries are able to read, modify, and
inject advertisements; or more specifically, BLE communication. Passive adver-
saries are able to eavesdrop advertisements.
2. Internal/External entity. Internal entities have legitimate Beacon+ access (e.g.,
hospital administrator).
3. Single/Coordinated group entities.
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4. Sophisticated/Unsophisticated Adversary. Sophisticated adversaries have access
to specialized equipment (e.g., high gain antennas). Unsophisticated adversaries
have access to common equipment (e.g., BLE sniffers).
Beacon+, the BLE device, smartphone, and backend server may all be used as
attack surfaces. For example, an adversary may disrupt Beacon+ advertisements by
physically destroying Beacon+ devices, or jamming or dropping advertisements. We
classify Beacon+ security threats into the following categories:
1. BLE interface threats. Adversary is able to passively eavesdrop on advertise-
ments, or actively jam, replay, modify, forge, or drop advertisements.
2. Software threats. Adversary is able to alter the logic of Beacon+ through soft-
ware vulnerabilities.
3. Application threats. Adversary is able to compromise the intended functionality
of an application.
Application-specific threats are unique to Beacon+ and non-obvious. For exam-
ple, an active adversary may attempt to circumvent location-based restrictions by
physically moving all Beacon+s to one central location. There exists threats with re-
spect to BLE devices, smartphones, and backend servers that we do not cover because
it is beyond the scope of Beacon+.
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5.4 Beacon+
Beacon+ is motivated by the lack of temporal freshness and security in the ma-
jority of deployed beacons. In particular, these beacons lack authentication and are
subject to spoofing attacks, i.e., an attacker can advertise another beacon’s identifi-
cation number to trick receivers into thinking that the real beacon is within range.
There is also no mechanism to provide users with a sense of when an advertisement
was generated because every advertisement from an individual beacon is identical.
To address these concerns, Beacon+ prevents spoofing attacks by adding lightweight
authentication (e.g., message authentication codes) and provides temporal freshness
by adding a monotonically increasing sequence number to each BLE advertisement.
Recipients can verify the identity of the sender and the time at which the advertise-
ment was sent. The Beacon+ design is based on the iBeacon182 specification, with all
Beacon+ data fitting into a single 27-byte BLE advertisement payload, to be univer-
sally compatible with existing BLE devices. The communication protocol is strictly
one-way from Beacon+ to listening devices. Beacon+ is targeted to run on existing
low-cost BLE hardware and thus we choose lightweight cryptographic mechanisms
(i.e., AES-128 CBC MAC) to keep computation and power consumption low.
During initialization, each Beacon+ is assigned a unique identification number
(ID), an initial value for the monotonically increasing sequence number (typically 1),
and a secret key that is used to compute message authentication codes. The secret
key is assigned a priori to deployment. In addition, as with current beacons, the
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Figure 5.1: iBeacon and Beacon+ advertisement formats. BLE advertisements can
support up to a 31-byte payload – 4 bytes are reserved for BLE structures and flags,
leaving 27 bytes for user-defined data.
TX Power, or the signal strength to the Beacon+ at 1 meter in Decibel-milliwatts
(dBm), is measured and set. The ID, current sequence number, secret key, and TX
Power are stored in non-volatile memory on the Beacon+ to ensure that the values
persist even if power is removed. When power is restored, Beacon+ loads its ID,
sequence number, secret key, and TX Power in order to continue operation without
interaction. Both the initial sequence number and the secret key are shared with the
entities that will authenticate the Beacon+ advertisements and check for temporal
freshness. The MAC is computed over the concatenation of the Beacon+ TX Power,
ID, and current sequence number with padding. Each second, Beacon+ increments it
sequence number, computes a new MAC tag, and replaces the previous advertisement
with the current one.
Figure 5.1 shows the Beacon+ advertisement format compared with that of tra-
ditional iBeacons. Note that although the Bluetooth 4.0 specification indicates that
there are 31 bytes to use for advertisement data, 4 of the bytes are reserved to define
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and describe substructures contained within the advertisements. Therefore, only 27
bytes can be used for data. Beacon+ uses 1 byte for the TX Power, 2 bytes for the
ID, 8 bytes for the monotonically increasing sequence number, and the remaining 16
bytes for the MAC. One restriction of this specific byte allocation is that only 216 or
65535 unique IDs can be supported. We choose to use 2 bytes for the ID in order to
allocate 8 bytes for the sequence number. Our notion for the prototype implemen-
tation was that each organization would maintain its own set of IDs, and therefore
IDs would not be globally unique. However, it may be the case that more than 2
bytes for the ID are desired. One option is to assign 4 bytes to the ID and 6 bytes for
the sequence number. This setup supports 232 (or approximately 4 billion) IDs and
provides a monotonically increasing sequence number that will survive approximately
9 million years2.
Beacon+ broadcasts its current advertisement at a specified rate. Faster rates
(e.g., eight times per second) improve the likelihood that receiving devices detect
the Beacon+ if it is in range, but increase the power consumption of the underlying
hardware. Slower rates conserve power consumption, but may result in receiving
devices failing to detect Beacon+ that are actually in range. Currently, we configure
Beacon+ to broadcast advertisements at a rate of eight times per second (every 125
microseconds), which matches the rate of many iBeacon implementations.
For Beacon+, we represent time using monotonically increasing sequence numbers
2Provided that the sequence number increases at a rate of once per second.
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that are incremented at a regular timeout rate, i.e., once per second. When each Bea-
con+ is setup, the initial sequence number is shared with the entities that will collect
and validate the advertisements. Upon receiving (and verifying) an advertisement
from a Beacon+, the entities can compare the sequence number in the advertisement
with the highest sequence number seen so far from that Beacon+. If the sequence
number in the advertisement is higher than of the highest sequence number seen, the
advertisement is accepted.
A more traditional approach than sequence numbers is to use timestamps mea-
sured on the local Beacon+ clock. However in practice, low-power devices that are
typically used for beacons are susceptible to clock skew, which affects the accuracy
and effectiveness of receiving valid Beacon+ advertisements. While Beacon+ could
be setup to occasionally synchronize its clock with an external source, we chose to
strictly enforce the one-way communication paradigm and avoided the problem of
distributed clock synchronization.
5.4.1 Implementation
We implemented the Beacon+ specification using the Texas Instruments MSP430FR5969
LaunchPad Development Kit223 and Bluegiga Bluetooth Low Energy BoosterPack for
the LaunchPad224 (see Figure 5.2). The MSP430 board runs the control logic of Bea-
con+. During initialization, each MSP430 board is assigned an ID, starting sequence
number (usually 1), secret key, and the appropriately calibrated TX Power. The
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Figure 5.2: Beacon+ is implemented using the TI MSP430 LaunchPad (underlying
red board) and Bluegiga Bluetooth BLE BoosterPack (top blue board).
MSP430 board is placed at a chosen location in the environment, and the ID, start-
ing sequence number, secret key, and chosen location are shared with the backend
server.
Once per the timeout rate, the MSP430 board increments the sequence number,
computes the message authentication code using AES-128 bit CBC MAC, and sends
the new advertisement to the BLE BoosterPack via the UART communication in-
terface. The BLE BoosterPack receives the latest advertisement from the MSP430
and sends it out at a regular interval of eight times per second. The transmitted ad-
vertisements are then collected by devices moving throughout the environment and
passed to the backend server for validation (see Section 5.5).
5.5 Applications
Beacon+ serves as a foundation for building many applications across a variety
of domains. We describe three such applications enabled by Beacon+, namely secure
real-time asset tracking, location-based restrictions on access control, and real-time
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navigation.
5.5.1 Secure Real-Time Asset Tracking System
Using Beacon+ (Section 5.4), we create a secure real-time asset tracking system
that is resilient to active and passive attacks using the temporal and authenticated
BLE communication. The tracking system is composed of three components: (1) Bea-
con+, (2) BLE–speaking devices that will be tracked (e.g. smartphone or tablet),
and (3) trusted backend server that validates Beacon+ advertisements and calculates
tracked devices’ positions.
The tracking system is initialized by placing Beacon+ throughout the environ-
ment at chosen locations (possibly hidden to mitigate tampering) that provide good
coverage of the area. This chosen location and the Beacon+’s assigned unique ID,
secret key, and starting sequence number is shared with the trusted backend server,
which is run by the system administrator. Note that at any time, an administrator
can return to a Beacon+ to refresh keys, apply firmware updates, or even replace
it entirely. As per the specification, each Beacon+ periodically broadcasts the au-
thenticated BLE advertisement containing its unique ID, monotonically increasing
sequence number, TX Power, and the corresponding MAC of the data.
Tracked BLE–speaking devices periodically collect the authenticated BLE adver-
tisements and corresponding received signal strength (RSSI) from all Beacon+ within
range. The device then sends a device update that contains the latest collected Bea-
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con+ advertisements to the backend server using some other communication medium
such as Wi-Fi, cellular, or wired LAN.
This device functionality can be added to existing medical devices that support
BLE with only a small modification. Note that some medical devices cannot speak
directly with the backend server. In this case, devices can leverage their existing
two-way BLE communication with data collectors (computers, smartphones, etc.) by
passing the Beacon+ broadcasts and RSSI values to a data collector, which in turn
will forward the data to the backend server. For older devices that do not support
BLE, a small standalone BLE module can be assigned and attached to each one. The
module will take care of collecting Beacon+ advertisements and forwarding device
updates to the backend server. As long as the module stays attached to the device,
the device is effectively tracked as though it was directly participating in the protocol.
To track personnel, each individual can carry their own smartphone or borrowed
hospital-issued tablet. These types of computing devices are increasingly used in
health-related environments due to the adoption of health information technology
and Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD).225 An App is installed on the devices that
collects Beacon+ advertisements and sends them over Wi-Fi or cellular networks to
the backend server. One concern with smartphones and tablets is the possibility that
the devices will be compromised via other software running on the device. Other BLE
devices, such as a ring or bracelet,226 can be used in place of smartphones or tablets
to avoid some of these concerns.
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Figure 5.3: Secure Real-Time Asset Tracking System based on Beacon+. BLE-
speaking devices collect authenticated Beacon+ advertisements and forward them to
the trusted backend server, which calculates devices’ positions.
Figure 5.3 shows an example of two different devices that are tracked. The first
device is a doctor’s iPhone, which can communicate directly to the backend server.
The second device is a heart rate monitor that cannot communicate directly with the
backend server, and relies on a data collection computer for forwarding.
Upon receiving a device update, the backend server validates each of the Beacon+
advertisements contained within that update. The backend server checks, using the
shared secret key for each Beacon+, that the MAC appended on an advertisement
matches the computed MAC over the data. If the MAC does not match, that adver-
tisement is discarded and not included in the location calculation. In addition, each
advertisement is checked for freshness by comparing the monotonically increasing
sequence number on the advertisement with the highest received sequence number



































Figure 5.4: Trilateration Example. r1, r2, and r3 (radius of the b1, b2, and b3
circles respectively) correspond to the calculated distance between the tracked device
and each Beacon+. The intersection of the three circles (marked by an X) determines
the location of the device.
calculated between the device and that Beacon+. Note that in order to track a de-
vice’s position at all times using trilateration, it must be within range of at least three
Beacon+ in order for the computation to succeed at the backend server. Therefore,
the number of Beacon+ deployed and their location should support this requirement
and provide a good coverage of the area. It may be worth setting up the Beacon+
such that devices are within range of four or five Beacon+, which will provide fault
tolerance in case some of the Beacon+ fail (e.g., the battery ran out of power). The
resiliency gained incurs only a small financial cost since the cost of each Beacon+ is
cheap.
In addition to computing a device’s location, the backend server continually up-
dates a database, which contains the location of each Beacon+, the location of each
tracked device, acceptable boundaries for each device, and a log of system events.
The database is read by a web application that visually displays the location of each
Beacon+ and tracked devices, the boundaries of each device, and the system events
152





Figure 5.5: Example Web-Based Application Showing Secure Real-Time Tracking
System. The blue circles are Beacon+, the solid red block is a tracked device, and
the red square outline is the acceptable boundary of that device.
as they occur in real-time. The backend server and web application can take action
(e.g., raise an alarm, send an email or text message) in response to problematic events,
such as when a device has left or is close to leaving the acceptable boundary.
Figure 5.5 shows a snapshot of an example web application that visualizes the
location of ten Beacon+ (blue circles), one device being tracked (solid red block),
and the acceptable boundary of that device (red square outline) on a single floor of
a university building. The web application enforces access control to ensure that the
location of devices (and Beacon+) can only be seen by authorized individuals.
Future Work. We use stationary Beacon+ devices in the implementation of our
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secure real-time asset tracking application. However, we note that it need not always
be the case that Beacon+ devices are fixed, nor do we design our application to
manage expected windows of missed advertisements due to the lack of tracked devices
to forward communication. We describe these scenarios below.
Static Infrastructure Devices. Since the Beacon+ do not communicate with one
another and do not communicate directly with the backend server, if there are cur-
rently no tracked devices within range of a Beacon+, the backend server will not
receive advertisements from that Beacon+. In this case, it is impossible to determine
if a Beacon+ is simply not in range of a device, or if the Beacon+ is experiencing a
benign failure (e.g., ran out of power) or an attack. Therefore, in addition to tracked
devices that move around, we can place static infrastructure devices in the envi-
ronment which guarantee that each Beacon+ always has at least one active device
forwarding its advertisements. We can then expect to see regular heartbeats from
both Beacon+ and devices, which is helpful in defeating many potential attacks.
Tracking Beacon Movement. Up to now, the Beacon+ were considered stationary.
It is useful to detect if a Beacon+ has moved locations. With the original designated
location for each Beacon+ and previous locations of devices and staff, the backend
server can distinguish normal from problematic Beacon+ advertisements forwarded
by tracked devices. Two examples include: (1) If a Beacon+ advertisement appears
in a location far from its designated area, it was likely moved (2) If a Beacon+ ad-
vertisement is missing from locations that it normally appears in, the Beacon+ may
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have moved, the battery may have died, or it may not be functioning correctly due to
tampering. In essence, the Beacon+ and assets can track each other simultaneously.
Moreover, current beacon hardware has the capability to provide analog sensor data
such as temperature and accelerometer data and we can include this data in addi-
tional advertisements to indicate movement as it occurs (rather than solely relying
on detecting movement a posteriori).
Attack Mitigations. An active inside or outside adversary may steal a device for
monetary gain or to cause harm. This attack is defeated because devices are tracked
in real-time and authorities are notified if devices are being moved from their intended
locations. In addition, this type of adversary may physically damage a Beacon+, re-
move the power source from a Beacon+, or perform sophisticated communication
jamming. Since the tracking system expects Beacon+ advertisements and device up-
dates (i.e., heartbeat), the backend server can implement a detection policy (much like
a network intrusion detection system) that generates alerts on unexpected behavior.
Or, the backend server can generate audit logs for retroactive analysis.
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5.5.2 Location–Based Restrictions on Access
Control
Sensitive data such as electronic medical records are protected using encryption
and single-factor access control mechanisms (e.g., PIN numbers, passwords) to limit
access to authorized individuals. However, this approach raises a major security
concern: an adversary that is able to bypass or break the access control security
gains access to all of the sensitive data in the database with a single breach. This
threat is made worse in the context of a hospital, where computing devices are often
used to access sensitive patient information, and a stolen or compromised device can
provide an attacker with a large portion of private data.
To address this threat, we implement a prototype application that provides an
access control mechanism that enforces location-based restrictions. The application
relies on the authenticity of received Beacon+ advertisements to compute the relative
location of an authenticated device compared to an asset, and provides access to the
asset data if and only if the device is within close physical proximity. In the hospital
setting, nurses and doctors who are away from their personal computer but moving
around with their smartphone must be within close physical proximity of a patient to
access her medical record. With this scheme, an access control breach only results in a
small fraction of sensitive data leakage, since an attacker that steals an authenticated
device only gets access to data that is within close proximity. The location is only
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one factor in a multi-factor access control scheme to authenticate a user.
Implementing the location-based restrictions application requires only minor addi-
tions to the secure real-time tracking system. Personnel can use the same smartphone
or BLE device they sign into for the tracking system to access sensitive data. As per-
sonnel move about the organization, the backend server tracks their location. When
the tracked device enters close proximity of assets, the backend server checks the cre-
dentials of the device and authenticity of the Beacon+ advertisements and sends the
device the appropriate data from assets in range. Similarly, when devices leave close
proximity of an asset, the backend server revokes access to that asset’s data and the
App removes the record3. The backend server can choose the level of granularity on
which to enforce location-based restrictions. For example, in the hospital context, the
backend server may choose to organize patient records based on room, rather than
solely using distance as the metric. In addition, the backend server can tailor the
information sent to the devices based on the credentials of the user (e.g., doctors may
be sent more sensitive information about a patient than nurses).
This approach provides location-based restrictions without the need of additional
authentication at every step. While an adversary that steals one of these authen-
ticated devices can see the sensitive information about nearby patients, the threat
is not much different from the existing accepted threat in which an adversary could
walk around the hospital and take the paper medical records that often sit unat-
3The App is also setup to remove data from the display after a configurable timeout, which
protects against an adversary that cuts network communication in an effort to force an asset’s data
to persist on the screen even after moving out of range of the asset.
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tended outside of patient rooms. One possibility is to have doctors re-authenticate
upon entering each room. This prevents an attacker from walking around with a
device to get basic patient information, but puts a burden on doctors and nurses.
This is a trade-off between privacy and usability which can be set as desired, and the
App supports both configurations.
In some cases, a doctor might require accessing more details of a patient’s health
records or may require accessing a medical record for a patient that is not in the same
room. In this case, the App on the device allows doctors to provide further forms of
authentication (e.g., fingerprint, additional password) to increase their access. Note
that this access is only provided temporarily each time additional authentication is
provided, preventing an adversary from breaking the location-based restrictions if the
device is stolen. Additionally, doctors can always return to their private offices to
use traditional access control techniques to gain access to a wider range of medical
records.
By using location-based restrictions for access control, hospitals get the techno-
logical and convenience benefits of electronic medical records with the traditional
privacy model of paper medical records, in that successful attackers only get access
to localized sensitive information rather than access to a large database of many
records.
Attack Mitigations. An active inside or outside adversary may perform a denial-
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of-service attack on the tracking system to cause patient harm or thwart productivity.
This attack is mitigated by having authorized individuals use additional authentica-
tion methods to bypass the location-based restrictions to temporarily gain access to
the records, use paper records as a backup, or return to their office to access records.
In addition, this type of adversary can steal a device that is used to obtain sensitive
data via the location-based restrictions application. This attack is mitigated by hav-
ing the device delete records when it is moved out of range of assets, as well as having
devices configured to delete records after a specified time elapses.
Note that the location-based restrictions application requires that the backend
server have knowledge of patient locations in the hospital (either at a physical location
or at room-level granularity). The tracking system can be made to track patient
locations by associating BLE devices with patients, or the backend server can link
with existing hospital management techniques that track patient locations.
5.5.3 Real-Time Navigation
In addition to security-driven applications, it is possible to provide user conve-
nience applications that run on top of the tracking system. One application that can
be useful in large organizations is a real-time navigation system for individuals that
are unfamiliar with the premises. For example, a patient or visitor in the hospital
may have a difficult time navigating the facility to find a particular patient room or a
specific doctor’s office. Moreover, hospital staff may be burdened by frequently hav-
159
CHAPTER 5. BEACON+: APPLICATIONS OF SHORT-RANGE
AUTHENTICATED UNIDIRECTIONAL ADVERTISEMENTS
ing to help visitors find their way and prevent them from wandering into restricted
areas.
The secure real-time tracking system can be used to provide real-time navigation.
In the hospital setting, patients and visitors are given a hospital-issued BLE device
(e.g., the same tablet that doctors or nurses are given) and sign in as a “guest” with no
security credentials. The device has a Navigation App that allows the guest to enter
a target room number or select a destination that is listed on the App (e.g., cafeteria,
cardiology center). The backend server tracks the device as the guest moves through
the hospital and sends the location back to the guest’s Navigation App. With the
current location and target destination, the App calculates the path that the guest
should take to get to the destination. This path is visually displayed as an overlay
on the device that visitors can easily follow, similar to GPS for indoor navigation. In
addition, the App tells visitors (or raises an alarm to alert staff) when they enter or
are close to entering a restricted area, reducing the burden on staff and raising staff
efficiency.
5.6 Experiments
We deployed the Beacon+ prototype in our environment to emulate a typical
deployment setting in order to evaluate the accuracy of the Beacon+ tracking system,
the feasibility of using Beacon+ compared to traditional beacons, and the effectiveness
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of using Beacon+ to enforce location-based restrictions on access control to sensitive
data.
5.6.1 Experimental Setup
We deployed 8 of the Beacon+ prototypes, evenly spaced to obtain good cover-
age of one side of the floor in our building, which emulates a setup similar to one
that would be used in typical hospital settings. Each Beacon+ was placed at its
chosen location and assigned a unique ID and secret key that is shared with the
backend server. Upon startup, each Beacon+ begins broadcasting an authenticated
BLE advertisement containing its unique ID, latest sequence number (monotonically
increasing once per second), calibrated transmit power at 1 meter, and MAC. Adver-
tisements are broadcast every 125 microseconds (8 times per second), matching the
specification of most iBeacon implementations. We experimented with several values
for n, the propagation constant from equation 5.1, and ultimately decided on n = 2.7
for our experiments. It provided the most accurate measured distance from Beacon+
prototypes compared with the actual location of the tracked devices.
In our setup, we used a Google Nexus 4 smart phone as the tracked device. We
created an Android App to periodically scan and collect all Beacon+ advertisements
within range (aggregating the measured RSSI values for each Beacon+ ID). The col-
lected advertisements are then bundled into a device update and sent via Wi-Fi to
the backend server, which authenticates each of the advertisements in the update
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and calculates the position of the device. After calculating the position, the backend
server updates the position of the device in a SQL database (to graphically display
on a website), and in the case of the location-based restrictions application (see Sec-
tion 5.6.4), sends a message back to the device containing the relevant information
to display on the screen.
5.6.2 Tracking System Accuracy
To measure the accuracy of our Beacon+ tracking system, we placed the device
at various locations and compared the calculated location from the tracking system
with the actual location in the building. Initially, we measured the accuracy using the
trilateration approach, using the measurements from the three Beacon+ prototypes
with the strongest received signal strength for that update. However, we found that
the measured signal strength from our BLE hardware contained a fair amount of
noise, often causing the trilateration calculation to fail (the resulting circles created
from the distance measurements did not intersect).
In general, trilateration provides a very accurate position calculation, but has rigid
requirements that may be hard to meet with inexpensive hardware producing noisy
measurements. Moreover, in the case of the tracking system, if trilateration fails for
a device’s update, the tracking system is essentially blind to changes in a device’s
position until a future update arrives on which trilateration succeeds. While this is
not an issue if the device being tracked is predominantly stationary, if the device is
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usually moving throughout the environment (e.g., nurse or doctor), failures to update
the tracking system at a regular interval can be problematic. Therefore, rather than
using trilateration in our experiments, we calculated the position of devices using an
approach that is less accurate, but more flexible. We describe this approach in detail
next.
Translated Midpoint Method. For each device update received, the backend server
sorts the valid Beacon+ advertisements in order of received signal strength and can
calculate the device’s position for this update as long as at least two advertisements
are valid (see Figure 5.6). If there are three or more valid advertisements, the backend
server uses the top three Beacon+ ads (based on RSSI values) and forms a triangle,
with one vertex corresponding to each of the Beacon+ locations in the environment.
Each vertex is then translated toward the midpoint of the opposite side of the triangle,
with translation distance proportional (or in our case, equal) to the measured distance
between the device and that Beacon+. If there are only two advertisements, a line
is formed between the two Beacon+ locations, and each point is translated toward
the other point with a distance equal to the measured distance from the device to
that Beacon+. Finally, the device’s position is calculated as the centroid of the
resulting triangle (in the case of three valid Beacon+ advertisements) or midpoint of
the resulting line (in the case of two Beacon+ advertisements).
Using the new approach, the resulting Beacon+ tracking system is flexible and
accurate, providing a position calculation with precision of 1-2 meters in the best case
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Figure 5.6: Translated Midpoint Method to calculate device position. With two
valid Beacon+ advertisements, a line is formed between the two Beacon+ locations
(b1 and b2). b1 and b2 are translated toward each other with distance r1 and r2
respectively, where r is the measured distance between the device and the Beacon+.
With three Beacon+ advertisements, a triangle is formed between b1, b2, and b3.
Each vertex is translated toward the opposite side of the triangle with distance r1,
r2, and r3 respectively. In both cases, once the vertices are translated, the device
position is calculated as the midpoint of either the resulting line or triangle (marked
by an X in the example).
and 9-10 meters in the worst case. Compared to the trilateration approach, the trans-
lated midpoint method achieves a better overall tracking system in the environment
of our experimentation.
5.6.3 Beacon+ Power Consumption
Estimating the production power consumption of Beacon+ is difficult due to the
fact that our prototype is running on an MSP430 LaunchPad development board and
thus power consumption is not indicative of real-world performance; the development
components of the board significantly contribute to the overall power draw. However,
we were able to provide a rough estimate of the overhead of Beacon+ compared to a
standard beacon by performing power analysis of our development board running as
both a standard iBeacon and Beacon+, and comparing the results.
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To perform our power analysis, we connected an MSP-430 LaunchPad to an Ag-
ilent programmable power supply. Since the MSP430 LaunchPad runs off of a +5V
power source, we set the output voltage to 5 volts and maximum current to 1 A
(much higher than was needed). Our power supply showed that in the case of the
MSP430 emulating an iBeacon, the power draw was between 15 and 20 mA. In the
case of the MSP430 emulating a Beacon+, the power draw was between 22 and 25
mA. Therefore, the overhead of Beacon+ over a standard Beacon running on our test
platform was between 20% and 46%.
5.6.4 Location-Based Restrictions on Access Con-
trol
With an accurate tracking system in place, we evaluate the practicality of us-
ing Beacon+ to provide an access control mechanism that enforces location-based
restrictions. We created an Android App that collects and forwards Beacon+ adver-
tisements to the backend server and displays database records (i.e., patient data) that
are sent in return. After validating a device and calculating its position, the backend
server compares the device position with the location of patients in the building and
only sends the device the records of nearby patients, i.e., the patients that are within
some threshold distance (10 meters in our experiments). When a device moves out
of range of a patient, that patient record is removed from the list in the App, since
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the backend server sends a new update that does not contain that patient record.
For this experiment, we created a mock patient record database on the backend
server based on the OpenMRS Demo Data,230 and set the location of four of the
patients in the database to locations in the building environment (yellow squares
shown in Figure 5.7). Then, we walked around the building with the smartphone
running the App to view the records of the nearby patients, i.e., the patients that
were within 10 meters of the device’s tracked position.
Figure 5.7 shows four snapshots (a through d) of the experiment in action. The
visual GUI of the Beacon+ tracking system is shown on the right. The GUI shows
the location of the Beacon+ prototypes (blue circles), the patients in the building
(yellow squares), and where the device is located at each snapshot (a through d). For
each snapshot in Figure 5.7, we also include the screen capture of the device running
the patient record access App at its respective location on the map.
In Figure 5.7a, the device is only within range of one patient (#1), and as a result
the App only displays the record for patient 1, “John Smith.” The patient locations
were purposely set in the environment such that there is only a small area in which a
device can be in range of all four patients simultaneously. Figure 5.7b shows this case,
and the corresponding screen capture shows that the device can see the records of all
four patients. In Figure 5.7c, the device is now out of range of the two patients on the
southern side of the building, and only the two nearby patient records are available
to view in the App. At any time, the user can click on one of the displayed records
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Figure 5.7: Location-Based Restrictions on Access Control. 8 Beacon+ prototypes
(blue circles) and 4 patients (yellow squares) are located in the environment as shown
by the Beacon+ tracking system GUI (right side). The red square shows the location
of an authenticated device (smartphone) that is requesting patient records at four
locations (labeled a through d). At each location, the screen capture of the App
running on the phone is shown, indicating which patients are in range (and thus
which records are accessible). Note that in d, no patients are within range of the
device. e shows patient-specific information that can be viewed in the App for patients
currently in range. 167
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in the App to view patient-specific information, e.g., current doctor and medication
for that patient. This feature is shown in Figure 5.7e. Finally, if the device is out of
range of all patients, the App will clear the screen, not showing any patient records
– this situation is shown in Figure 5.7d.
The experiment shows that the device is only able to access records of patients
that are within close proximity – the App cannot obtain records for patients that
are not within range, nor patients that are in the database but not currently located
in the environment. This validates that Beacon+ can provide another factor for
multi-factor authentication, namely location information, to enforce access control of
sensitive data.
5.7 Conclusion
In this work, we have shown that Beacon+, a BLE device that transmits short-
range unspoofable, authenticated advertisements, can be used to implement multiple
location-based applications. Specifically, we implemented a secure real-time tracking
system that uses Beacon+ to more securely track assets and provides a foundation
for two related applications: real-time indoor navigation, which we described, and
location-based restrictions on access control, which we implemented. Lastly, we vali-
dated the accuracy and feasibility of Beacon+ by deploying low-cost BLE hardware






Modern computer systems require a user to prove his or her identity through an
authentication process. While a variety of authentication processes including pub-
lic key authentication, biometrics, and passwords exist, passwords remain the most
widely used authentication mechanism because of their ease of use and implemen-
tation. However, password-based authentication is only as strong as the passwords
that users choose, and users often choose passwords that are too simplistic and easily
guessed.231 Thus, administrators encourage or force users to select more complex and
longer passwords, decreasing user satisfaction as password selection becomes increas-
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ingly difficult.
Exacerbating the initial selection challenges, the likelihood of entering a password
incorrectly during subsequent uses increases with password complexity and length,
as does the time to enter and re-enter it. In certain settings such as healthcare
environments, complex passwords may not be compatible with the time-sensitive
nature of the workflow, as such passwords may be too cumbersome to repeatedly
enter.
To address this issue, we introduce KBID. KBID is a design for a wearable authen-
tication system that allows its user to enter a password as infrequently as once per
day. Our proposed system stores authentication information on a wearable bracelet
and transmits this information to devices the user wishes to authenticate. The trans-
mission between the bracelet and device is achieved by touching the bracelet to a
contact terminal, and, therefore, is not vulnerable to existing radio attacks on wire-
less authentication technologies. Our goal is to reduce the impact on user satisfaction
and efficient workflow without compromising the security of the underlying system
by removing most of the difficulty of using a complex password.
Of course, although our direct-contact bracelet is not vulnerable to RF-based
attacks, it could have still be vulnerable to other types of attacks such as man-in-
the-middle attacks and replay attacks. However, we have designed our system to be
robust against these types of attacks as well, as we will show in Section 6.5.
Our KBID design can authenticate a user in less than one second given that
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user has already provided valid credentials once after putting on the bracelet for that
session, such as at the beginning of his or her shift. We believe that such a system will
reduce the resistance to strong password requirements by allowing users to enter their
passwords infrequently. To put it simply, users will be more willing to use a strong
password if they only have to enter it once a shift as opposed to being prompted to
enter the password each time they use a computer system.
We believe KBID would be particularly well suited to solving authentication prob-
lems in healthcare environments. In such environments, workers often encounter
emergency situations where they do not have time to remember and enter a long and
complex password. In such a situation, KBID would allow the healthcare worker to
authenticate instantaneously, thus ensuring patient privacy while simultaneously al-
lowing instant access. KBID could further be modified to allow a user to log-in even
in the event of a failed authentication as long as the log-in is registered so that the
access could be appropriately scrutinized after the emergency situation is resolved.
6.2 Background
KBID originated from the idea of integrating a wearable device to achieve some ad-
ditional property in an authentication system (e.g., de-authentication). Its design was
partially inspired by the design of zero-effort bilateral recurring authentication (ZE-
BRA) by Mare et al.,62 which is discussed in the related work section. A fundamental
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limitation of ZEBRA is that it was only envisioned as a method to de-authenticate a
user from a computer system and did not include a way to initially authenticate the
user to the system. Starting with the assumption that a ZEBRA user has already
consented to wearing a deauthentication bracelet, we looked to add the functionality
necessary to support rapid authentication as well in order to increase the usefulness
of the system.
We avoided using radio frequency (RF) technologies because RF emits informa-
tion into the environment. That information, once emitted, can be received and
rebroadcasted. This opens up RF-based systems to active attacks such as ghost-
and-leech attacks.232 Ghost-and-leech attacks occur when an attacker uses a more
powerful radio transmitter than the transmitter found on a wireless device in order
to capture and rebroadcast the wireless signal; the goal is to fool a target system into
believing that the wireless device is in closer proximity to it than it actually is at
the time. While it may be possible to avoid some such attacks through the use of
cryptography, our system eliminates this attack surface entirely by requiring that the
user be in physical contact with the authentication device to transmit authentication
information.
In the medical context, an attacker could capture and rebroadcast the authen-
tication signal off of an authentication wearable in order to log in to a computer
terminal even when an authorized user is not near the terminal. For example, in a
hospital, a doctor might wear an authentication bracelet which continuously broad-
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casts a changing login credential using Bluetooth Low Energy. An attacker might
place a receiver next to a target doctor’s office. The receiver could then capture the
signal and send it to a portable rebroadcaster, which the attacker could use to unlock
a computer terminal far from the doctor’s office. Due to the wireless nature of this
type of authentication wearable, these attack approaches can be extremely difficult
to protect against.
In addition to this concern, RF also relies on the security of the underlying com-
munication infrastructure. If a security flaw is discovered in an RF communication
framework, e.g. Bluetooth low energy (BLE),233 then the system as a whole could be
vulnerable to the flaw.
Furthermore, we designed KBID such that an authenticated bracelet is non-
transferrable (i.e., a user cannot authenticate and then give the bracelet to someone
else). To support this feature, our design zeros all authentication information upon
bracelet removal. To facilitate data transmission using KBID, our prototype uses di-
rect contact with an authentication plate to transmit the authentication information.
In the future we believe that KBID could also be implemented using body-coupled
communication (BCC) to transmit its information over human skin.
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6.3 Related Work
In addition to the deauthentication work of ZEBRA which was briefly mentioned
in the previous section, there have been a few other previous attempts at develop-
ing wearable authentication technology. Two existing technologies of note include
the Bionym Nymi234 and the Intel Authentication Bracelet,235 but both are wireless
devices.
6.3.0.1 ZEBRA: Zero-Effort Bilateral Recurring Authentica-
tion
ZEBRA62 was developed to solve a very different problem than the authentication
bracelets. Instead of authenticating a user to a computer terminal, ZEBRA is focused
on detecting when a user is done using the computer terminal and deauthenticating
the user from the terminal even if the user forgets to do so. In ZEBRA, a user wears a
bracelet that encapsulates a wireless radio, accelerometer, and gyroscope; these com-
ponents record and transmit wrist movements to a computer system that is currently
being used. The computer system continually compares received movement measure-
ments to input it receives from its keyboard and mouse. If these two measurements
are not correlated, the current session is de-authenticated.
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6.3.0.2 Bionym Nymi
The Bionym Nymi234 is an authentication wristband that broadcasts a digitally
signed authentication signal derived from a user’s heartbeat to nearby devices using
Bluetooth Low Energy. The Nymi extracts reproducible but unique features from the
user’s ECG waveform. The Nymi is meant to be used as a biometric authentication
system and is envisioned as operating without any user input.
6.3.0.3 Intel Authentication Bracelet Prototype
Intel, in partnership with Fossil, has announced a prototype for an authentication
bracelet based on its Curie platform.235 The bracelet is designed to automatically
unlock a device when a given user is nearby. When the bracelet is first put on,
the user must log in to a bracelet-enabled device with a standard password. How-
ever, subsequent logins to bracelet-enabled devices do not require a password and
the bracelet will continue to broadcast an authentication token until the bracelet has
been taken off, causing the device’s volatile storage to lose the authentication creden-
tial. The bracelet uses Bluetooth Low Energy to broadcast its credential to nearby
bracelet-enabled devices.
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6.4 Threat Model
KBID is an authentication mechanism that requires a wearable device to trans-
mit short-range authentication data through direct contact with a contact plate. We
recognize confidentiality, integrity, and availability as security goals specific to KBID.
Particularly, data stored on the device and transmitted to the authentication module
should be kept secret from and not modifiable by unauthorized entities, and the data
should be accessible to both bracelet and authentication module. We are not con-
cerned with the privacy of the authenticating user because the system must validate
her access to the system or resource.
As a hardware and software solution, the threat model for KBID includes many
subjects that apply to any such system. These include attack types (denial of service,
message forging or tampering, hardware tampering, and others) as well as a study of
potential adversaries and other topics. Here we focus on two threats that are unique
to KBID. These threats require an active adversary that has the ability to enter within
close proximity of where KBID is used. For example, it may be possible to imper-
sonate an authentication module. An attacker could use a counterfeit authentication
module that issues Get Status commands when a user touches something connected
to it. Our design accounts for such an attack by integrating a challenge-response
protocol into the handshake between the bracelet and the authentication module.
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6.5 Design
Here we describe in detail the design of the KBID system. First we discuss the
high level design and explain the four major components of the system. Next, we
discuss the system workflow. Finally, we present the authentication protocol.
6.5.1 High Level Design
The system is composed of four main parts: a bracelet (Figure 6.1), an authenti-
cation module (Figure 6.2), an authentication client, and a Kerberos authentication
server. The bracelet is a wearable device that fastens to the user’s wrist. The bracelet
makes contact with the user’s skin and applies a signal directly to the user’s skin. The
authentication module has a sensor with a button under it. When the user touches
the sensor and depresses the button, the authentication module initiates communi-
cation with the bracelet. The authentication module is attached via RS-232 serial
to the computer system the user wants to authenticate. A workstation hosts the
authentication client. The client monitors the serial connection for data and, when
necessary, opens a connection to the Kerberos server for authentication. Finally, the
Kerberos server is a default installation and uses the default implementation of the
authentication protocol.
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Figure 6.1: KBID Prototype Bracelet
6.5.2 System Workflow
The system workflow can be described in two use cases; for the sake of brevity
we do not include any error handling. In the first use case (Figure 6.3) the user is
wearing a bracelet but the bracelet is not yet authenticated. The user touches the
bracelet to the contact pad on the authentication module, the authentication module
sees that the user’s bracelet is not authenticated, and the authentication module
then relays this information to the authentication client. The client prompts the
user for their username and password. The client verifies this information with the
Kerberos server, then instructs the user to touch the sensor on the authentication
module again. The client then instructs the authentication module to write the
authentication information derived from the ticket (described below) to the bracelet.
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Figure 6.2: KBID Prototype Authentication Module
Once this information has been written, the client unlocks the workstation.
In the second use case (Figure 6.4) the user has already authenticated the bracelet.
The user touches the sensor on the authentication module. The authentication module
sends a challenge and asks for a status, and the bracelet provides responds to the
challenge by sending it the transformed authentication information (described below).
The module passes this information along to the client which uses the information
to recover the Kerberos ticket. The client verifies the ticket with the Kerberos server
and unlocks the workstation. Our goal is to perform this use case in less than one
second.
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Figure 6.3: Un-Authenticated Message Exchange
6.5.3 Authentication Protocol
The actual protocol used to store security information on the KBID bracelet is
designed to be as small and lightweight as possible in order to fit within the limited
resources of our prototype implementation bracelet. Despite our emphasis on size,
we have made no security tradeoffs whatsoever to achieve our goals.
6.5.3.1 Authentication Protocol Workflow
To authenticate to a terminal for the first time, a KBID user touches the unau-
thenticated bracelet to the authentication module, enters a password, and touches the
bracelet again. The terminal uses the password to authenticate the user to a Kerberos
server. Provided that the authentication information is correct, the Kerberos server
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Figure 6.4: Authenticated Message Exchange
sends a Kerberos ticket to the terminal. The terminal saves the ticket, hashes it, and
generates a random key. It pushes the hash value, H and the key, K, to the bracelet,
which is now considered to be authenticated.
When the user wants to authenticate to the terminal in the future, the user touches
the bracelet to the authentication module. The terminal recognizes the bracelet and
sends a nonce, N to the bracelet. The bracelet responds by sending ENCK(N |H)
to the terminal. The terminal, knowing K, H, and N , decrypts the message in
order to get (N |H). It computes N |H|N in order to recover the hash value of the
Kerberos ticket, H. Having obtained this value, the terminal looks up the actual
ticket in its table using H as its key. It uses this ticket to re-authenticate the user.
The nonce in the protocol prevents replay attacks. Note that this system could be
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. However, we believe that hardening the
bracelet against such attacks is not worth the added space requirements, given that
such attacks would be the result of a physically compromised authentication module.
If the authentication module is deployed with suitable care then such tampering
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should be easy to identify.
6.6 Implementation
We have built a hardware prototype for the KBID bracelet and the authentication
module. Our prototypes are based on the Atmel ATMega328 microcontroller operat-
ing at 20 MHz, and an LM358AN Amplifier. Both the bracelet and the authentication
module have copper pads that make contact with each other. The prototype for the
authentication client has been written in Python. We also implemented the function-
ality that clears the authentication information when the bracelet is removed. This
was accomplished by using one of the hardware interrupts on the microcontroller.
6.6.1 Interfaces and Communication
The KBID system includes three interfaces: the interface between the bracelet and
the authentication module; the interface between the authentication module and the
authentication client, which takes place over RS-232 serial; and finally, the interface
between the authentication client and the Kerberos server, which uses the network.
6.6.1.1 Bracelet to Authentication Module
The communication protocol between the bracelet and the authentication module
is a very lightweight protocol. The messages that the bracelet sends to the authen-
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tication modules are called statuses. The messages that the authentication module
sends to the bracelet are called commands. Each message sent over this interface
is a length delimited series of bytes. A status message has the following structure:
[Status ID] [Device ID] [Data Size (in bytes)] [Data]. The bracelet will send one of
two statuses, authenticated or un-authenticated. If the status is authenticated, the
authentication data will be transmitted in the data field.
Status ID 1 Byte
Device ID 4 Bytes
Token Size 2 Bytes
Token 0 to 65535 bytes
The Status ID will be sent as 0x01 if the bracelet is not authenticated and 0x02
if the bracelet is authenticated. The Bracelet ID will always be transmitted when
the bracelet sends a status - it is a unique identifier for the specific bracelet. If the
bracelet is not authenticated the Token Size field will be set to 0x00 and the token
will be of length 0. If the bracelet is authenticated then the Token Size field will
reflect the length of the token that follows. Naturally, the token data will be of a
length defined by the token size field.
A command message has the following structure: [Command ID] [Device ID]
[Payload Size (in bytes)] [Payload]. These fields are delimited by length according to
the following table:
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Command ID 1 byte
Device ID 4 bytes long
Payload Size 2 Bytes
Payload 0 to 65535 bytes
The authentication module will send three commands. The first command is a
”Get Status” command; this is the only command to which the bracelet will respond.
The Command ID is 0x01. The Device ID is set to a special value of 0xFFFFFFFF
which the bracelet will regard as a broadcast ID, and the payload size is 0x0000 with
a payload of length 0. When the bracelet receives a ”Get Status” message it responds
with a status message.
The second command is a ”Set Token” command. The Command ID is 0x02. The
Device ID is set to the ID of the bracelet, and the payload size will be set to the length
of the token to be stored. The token will be appended after the message. When the
bracelet receives a ”Set Token” command it will store the payload in memory and set
its status to ”Authenticated.”
Finally, the authentication module can send a ”De-authenticate” command. The
Command ID is set to 0x03 and the Device ID is set to the device ID of the bracelet
to be authenticated. The Payload Size is 0x00 and the payload is of length 0. When
the bracelet receives this message it will clear any token it has, byte by byte and set
its status to ”Un-Authenticated.”
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6.6.1.2 Authentication Module to Authentication Client
The authentication module and the authentication client communicate status and
command messages as well. The authentication module can send three statuses to the
authentication client. First is the Un-authenticated Bracelet message. This message
is sent to the authentication client when the authentication module receives an un-
authenticated status from a bracelet.
Next the authentication module can send an Authenticated Bracelet status to the
authentication client. It will send this status when the bracelet sends a status of
authenticated. The Authenticated Bracelet status will contain the ticket information
that was in the token section of the bracelet’s message.
Finally, the authentication module can send a Ticket Written status to the authen-
tication client. This is a message that lets the client know that the ticket information
has been successfully written to the bracelet.
The authentication client sends two commands to the authentication module.
First the Write Ticket command. This instructs the authentication module to pass
the ticket included in the command to the bracelet with a Set Token command.
The authentication client can also send a De-authenticate Bracelet command. This
instructs the authentication module to issue a De-Authenticate command to the
bracelet.
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6.7 Future Work
Future work will focus on improving the system.
6.7.1 Hardware Upgrades
One could implement the system using a microcontroller that can store a larger
amount of authentication data. The Atmel ATMega328 only has 2 kilobytes of ram.
Since the systems needs some RAM to perform operations, the amount of authentica-
tion data that can be stored in RAM is limited to about 1 kilobyte. While 1 kilobyte
of RAM is sufficient for the Kerberos-based security protocol that we propose in this
paper, this amount of RAM may not be sufficient enough to store authentication
information in some real world use cases.
6.7.2 Password-less Authentication
In the long term, a future project could continue the development of the system
model to include a system where passwords are not required at all. In one such
implementation, a user would check in with a security technician who would personally
and physically validate the user’s identity then provide the user with a bracelet and
assist with authenticating the user without the user entering any information into a
computer at all.
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6.7.3 Body-Coupled Communication
We believe that a natural extension to KBID would be to allow the bracelet to use
body-coupled communication in order to provide even more seamless authentication.
Using BCC has been proposed in other work as well. For exmaple, Chang et al.
introduce a system for key exchange over a body area network.59 By applying a very
small voltage to the tissue of a dead mouse, they were able to communicate at a rate
of 5Hz or 5 bits per second. However, this data rate is not acceptable for our work
as we would need to communicate authentication data of at least 256 bits, and this
would take nearly a minute to transmit. Thus a BCC implementation of KBID has
been left as an exercise for future work.
6.7.3.1 Preliminary Tests
We ran some preliminary tests on integrating BCC into KBID in order to deter-
mine the feasibility of implementing BCC in a future project. We are able to send
commands from the authentication module to the bracelet. The bracelet can correctly
interpret those commands and it responds when issued a Get Status command.
Our test results showed that a full BCC-based implementation would have two
major hurdles to overcome. First, in order to successfully send a signal, the bracelet
and the authentication module must have a common reference for voltage. Second,
while we have been able to get the signal to transmit from the authentication module
to the bracelet, we have not been able to get the signal to travel in the opposite
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direction and arrive in a way that the signal can be interpreted by the authentication
module. To solve both of these issues, we believe that one could instead use capacitive
coupling to transmit data over the skin.
6.8 Conclusion
Password-based authentication is only as strong as the passwords that users
choose, and users often choose passwords that are too simplistic and easily guessed.
Thus, administrators encourage or force users to select more complex and longer
passwords, decreasing user satisfaction as password selection becomes increasingly
difficult. In certain settings such as healthcare environments, complex passwords
may not be compatible with the time-sensitive nature of the workflow, as such pass-
words may be too cumbersome to repeatedly enter. In this work we have presented
KBID, a design for a Kerberos-based identification bracelet. KBID solves authen-
tication challenges in fast-paced environments in a way that exposes a significantly
smaller attack surface than existing solutions. KBID uses a lightweight and efficient
protocol to secure its communications can be used in a clinical setting in order to




In this dissertation we have explored many aspects of security and privacy in the
medical space. We have presented tools to automatically audit accesses in electronic
medical record systems in order to proactively detect privacy violations; to fingerprint
network-facing protocols in order to non-invasively survey devices vulnerable to known
attacks; and to authenticate healthcare providers to medical devices without a need
for a password in a manner that protects against all known attacks present in radio-
based authentication technologies. We also presented an extension to the widely-
used beacon protocol in order to add security in the face of active attackers and we
demonstrated an overhead-free solution to protect embedded medical devices against
attacks that leveraging built-in device modes in order to maliciously reconfigure the
device.
The technologies proposed in this dissertation will serve to transform the health-
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CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY
care environment of the future. They will work together to form a new technological
system that improves security and privacy while simultaneously making the job of
a healthcare provider easier and more efficient. In many cases, healthcare providers
resist integrating new security and privacy technologies into their workflow because
they believe that these technologies add overhead that increases the complexity of
their existing workflow. In contrast, the future healthcare environment proposed in
this work does the opposite–it improves security and privacy while simplifying the
healthcare providers workflow. We believe that these approaches represent the future
of security and privacy in healthcare.
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